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INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY: 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 
lNsoPPAK* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decades, we have seen the global economic integration in 
the world of international finance. In particular, financial markets have 
witnessed a remarkable increase in the cross-border capital flows around 
the globe. However, the impact of financial globalization has raised a 
number of concerns in the wake of international financial turbulence. 
In recent years, effects of financial globalization on state sovereignty 
have been subject to critical scrutiny. Some people argue the process of 
financial globalization propelled by the information revolution and 
technological innovations has posed potential dangers to a countries' 
ability to pursue national tax regimes generating revenue losses and 
fiscal threats due to taxpayers' shifts in financial activities seeking cross-
border tax arbitrage and lower tax jurisdictions. 
* SJ.D. (Scientiae Juridicae Doctor) Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law. I 
owe immense encouragement and academic inspiration to Distinguished Professor of International 
and Comparative Law Sompong Sucharitkul. Also, I am indebted to Law Professor Chris Okeke 
and Finance Professor Hamid Shomali at Golden Gate University for academic guidance. In 
addition, I greatly appreciate the dedicated and excellent research assistance provided by Nancy 
Sheldon at Golden Gate University Law Library. Finally, I am grateful to the editors of the Annual 
Survey ofInternational and Comparative Law. I am, of course, solely responsible for any remaining 
errors. 
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It may be argued that international cooperation to neutralize different tax 
systems is necessary to enhance national and worldwide welfare. 
However, others claim the process of financial globalization has fostered 
the tax autonomy of a nation-state in providing a tax inducement to 
attract business activities from another country to its jurisdiction. 
Arguably, the increased mobility of capital has strengthened the state 
sovereignty over national tax policy leading to international tax 
competition. 
At the center of the debate, this paper takes the position that the 
relationship between financial globalization and national fiscal 
sovereignty lies somewhere between the globalism that stresses 
international tax harmonization and cooperation among national tax 
authorities, and the realism that emphasizes the primacy of a nation-state 
as a key driver behind international tax competition. 
Given the close relationship between financial globalization and national 
fiscal sovereignty, there is a strong need to examine the current 
international tax regime. This paper begins with a description of 
globalization and analyzes its nature and effects on the financial 
environment. Implications of globalization for state sovereignty are also 
addressed. In particular, global challenges to national fiscal sovereignty 
are discussed. In this context, this writing clarifies the concept of tax 
jurisdiction and reviews problems with the national tax systems such as 
double taxation, and taxpayers' cross-border arbitrage which results from 
the increased mobility of capital associated with financial globalization. 
Furthermore, an emphasis has been given to discuss the pros and cons of 
tax competition and harmonization. 
More importantly, this article attempts to search for the measures to 
enhance global governance in the international tax regime. In this regard, 
an analysis of the network of tax treaties is provided. I then move on to 
review the role of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) as a global tax network in international taxation. 
In this context, an emphasis is placed on the evaluation of global network 
governance conducted by independent decentralized government 
agencies in the international economy under international law. In 
addition, an argument about the creation of the International Tax 
Organization (ITO) is discussed. Finally, this paper concludes by seeking 
alternatives to enhance global tax governance through the coordination 
of a bilateral tax treaty network and a global tax network in international 
finance. 
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II. GLOBALIZATION AND THE FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT 
A. FINANCIAL INNOVATION 
Globalization l is underway in various dimensions today more than ever. 
Among the enormous challenges driven by the process, it is worth noting 
that globalization propelled by the information revolution2 and 
technology innovations has brought about the increasing needs of cross-
border relationships between countries. Remarkably, transborder flows 
of financial information motivated by new computer based technologies 
have grown up more rapidly than any other sector thus resulting in the 
increasing interdependence among financial markets and market 
participants both within and across national boundaries. 
The global financial system has been evolving at ever-fast rates in the 
past decades. Undeniably, the impact of globalization and the internet 
has created the profound changes in the international financial services 
industry. New technology has radically reduced the cost of borrowing 
and lending across national borders facilitating the development of new 
instruments and drawing in new players.3 
Indeed, computer and telecommunication technology has made it 
possible to use the integrated system and programmes for conducting 
highly complex financial transactions and for an immediate and systemic 
exploitation of the flood of available information that may be of 
relevance for financial operations.4 The massive use of the Internet has 
created not only a huge jump in transaction volumes but also the 
utilization of highly complex financial innovations. The whole range of 
ever more sophisticated derivative instruments5 which are used to refine 
I. Globalization commonly refers to the erosion of geographical borders among nations in the 
form of cross-border exchange of goods, services and information technology along with cultural 
transfers. See Roman Terrill, W7zat does 'Globalization' mean? 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 217, 218 (1999). One observer describes globalization as "the interaction of national 
economic systems." See Alan Greenspan, Opening Remarks for the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansa 
City symposium on Global Economic Integration: Global Opportunities and Challenges (August 24-
26, 2000) at I 
2. The information revolution has raised the significance of the "back office operations" 
supporting other business activities, which were formerly considered as mere "plumbing," but now 
main operational process of business organizations seeking more profits. See Jane K. Winn, 
Catalytic Impact of Information Technology on the New International Financial Architecture, 34 
INT'L L. 137, 146 (2000). 
3. Alan Greenspan, Testimony before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, US 
House of Representatives (January 30, 1998) at I 
4. Mario Giovanoli, Virtual Money and the Global Financial Market: Challenges for 
Lawyers, I Y.B. OF INT'L FIN. & ECON. L. 3, 16 (1996). 
5. A derivative is a financial instrument whose value is based on (derived from) other assets 
or variable. Derivatives include options, swaps, and warrants. See generally Hal S. Scott & Philip A. 
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further the allocation of instrument risk mostly traded in over the 
counter6 markets.7 As a result, electronic exchanges have been used 
around the globe for traditional stock-exchange business and for futures8 
thanks in part to the specific programmes along with modern data-
processing techniques. 
However, the growth of global networked information systems poses 
serious threats to the soundness of financial markets thus destabilizing 
markets around the world because financial information can be 
transmitted so quickly across borders.9 It is argued that "excessive 
computerization has also tended to deform the financial services industry 
into a game driven by sheer lust for financial gain, without a broader 
sense of self-discipline or concern for the overall welfare of the economy 
or society."IO As a result, a good number of gullible investors in a scam 
investment scheme can destabilize the safety of financial markets by 
rushing in and out of the market based on misperceptions.lI 
Undoubtedly, the global integration of information technology has 
become a challenge to the participants of the financial markets. On the 
one hand, financial services providers need to survive increasing 
competition with competitors through the prudent management of risks 
entailed by acting on the opportunities offered by new technologies. On 
the other hand, regulatory and supervisory authorities should keep pace 
with rapid financial innovation and make endeavors by striking an 
appropriate balance in the midst of a rapidly changing market 
environment since the evolution of the financial services industry driven 
by technological advances is not likely to stop. 
B. FINANCIAL INTEGRATION 
Over the past decades, financial markets have tended to become more 
tightly linked across national boundaries. A notable example of capital 
market linkages among the countries is the introduction of Euro along 
Wellons, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 921-
998 (5th ed. 1998). 
6. Securities transactions are conducted through a telephone and computer network 
connecting dealers in stocks and bonds rather than through an exchange. See id. at 800-801. 
7. Giovanoli, supra note 4. 
8. Futures are an agreement to buy or sell a fixed quantity of a particular commodity, 
currency, or security for delivery at a fixed rate. Unlike an option, a future contract involves a 
definite purchase or sale and not an unlimited loss. See generally Scott & Wellons, supra note 5. 
9. Winn, supra note 2, at 137. 
10. Toyoo Gyoten, Global Financial Markets: The Past, The Future, and Public Policy, in 
REGULATING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: ISSUES AND POLICIES 18 
(Franklin R. Edwards et ai., eds., 1991). 
11. Winn, supra note 2, at 143. 
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with the advent of EMU (European Monetary Union) which represents a 
significant change since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 
1971 and the movement to floating exchange rates in 1973. 12 
The EMU has eliminated exchange rate fluctuations among the eleven 
participating countries and dramatically reducing interest spreads and the 
volatility of the spreads. 13 The emergence of a unified money market for 
liquidity with the rapid start of EMU has created a two-tiered structure. 
The first tier includes the large banks in each domestic market which 
compete for the European Central Bank (ECB) funds at auction and trade 
liquidity among them effectively distributing liquidity throughout the 
Euro area. These large banks operate as hubs for distributing liquidity to 
a second-tier of smaller institutions in national markets. 14 
As for emerging market economies, dramatic evidence of their linkage to 
global financial markets was drawn during the Asian financial crisis 
which was preceded by a massive surge in gross private capital flows to 
emerging market countries and a deep compression of spreads for 
emerging market borrowers. IS 
For example, the five Asian crisis countries (Thailand, Malaysia, South 
Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines) received $47.8 billion in foreign 
bank loans in 1996. This capital inflow turned into a $29.9 billion 
outflow in 1997, a turnaround of almost $80 billion. 16 Some argues that 
these changes represent "a shift in tastes of global investors either toward 
lower assessment of the risks of investing in [Asian] emerging markets 
12. Horst Koeler, The Euro·An Emblem Success and Challenges oj European Integration, 
Remarks on the Occasion of the Informal Meeting of the ECOFIN Council (December 14,2001) 
http://www.imf.org/externallnp/speechesl2001l12140I.htm; see also Bertold Wahlig, European 
Monetary Law: The Transition to the Euro and the scope oj Lex Monetae, in INTERNATIONAL 
MONET ARY LAW: ISSUES FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM Ch. 6 (Mario Giovanoli ed., 2000). 
13. The participating countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain. All the European countries are expected to join the 
EMU by 2010 under the condition that all goes well and the monetary union is prosperous. See 
Robert Mundell, The Euro: How Important? 18 CATO J. 441,444 (Winter 1999). 
14. International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and 
Key Policy Issues 13 (September 2000). 
15. Michael Mussa, Factors Driving Global Economic Integration, the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Kansas City symposium paper for Global Economic Integration: Global Opportunities and 
Challenges 16-17 (August 25, 2000), at http://www.imf.org/externallnp/speechesl2000/082500.htm. 
The Chart 5 in Mussa's paper illustrates the financing conditions for emerging markets between 
1990 and 2000. According to Mussa's paper, factors driving global economic integration fall into 
three categories: technological developments, social and individual for the benefits of globalization, 
and public policy. He stresses that these factors have acted individually and interactively in driving 
inte grati on. 
16. Martin N. Baily et aI., The Color oj Hot Money, 79 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, No.2 
(MarchlApriI2000) at 101. 
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or toward greater acceptance of such risks.'m Encouragingly, a recent 
annual data on net private capital flows to emerging markets show that 
net inflows stabilized in 1999 after large falls during 1997-1998.18 
With financial globalization, the international capital flows have 
increased markedly in the 1990s. Some emphasize the need to determine 
if there has been a genuine increase in financial market integration 
because cross-border financial market linkages do not necessarily imply 
a high degree of financial integration. 19 It is worth noting that according 
to the causes of the increase in financial market integration the 
evaluation of degree of financial integration may be variably different. In 
short, this is because the welfare and policy implications of the apparent 
higher linkages depend on whether they are the outcome of greater 
market integration, fewer barriers to free financial trade in the context of 
financial services liberalization or the globalization of information which 
still entails barriers.20 
Here, there is still a need to investigate the persuasive evidence of 
growing international financial integration over the last decade. One 
adopts two indicators to support the evidence. 21 The first indicator is the 
sharp expansion in the scale of both gross and net capital flows between 
industrial countries and between developed and emerging markets. 22 
According to a balance-of-payments statistics, net inflows into emerging 
economies rose from virtually zero in 1989 to reach $307 billion in 1996 
before falling to half that level during 1997-1998.23 
17. Mussa, supra note 15, at 17. 
18. IMF, supra note 14, at 44-45 ("The stabilization of net private capital flows reflects 
continuing growth in foreign direct investment and a recovery in portfolio investment, which more 
than offset a continuing cutback in bank lending."). According to the report, net capital inflows to 
five Asian crisis countries have been broadly unchanged from 1998. 
19. Juan Ayuso & Roberto Blanco, Has financial market integration increased during the 
1990s?, BIS Conference Papers No.8 (March 2000), International Financial Markets and the 
Implications for Monetary and Financial Stability, at 175-195. Ayuso and Blanco focus on stock 
markets and compute direct measures of the changes in market integration in 1990s. They argue that 
the main driving factor behind the increase in financial market linkages is the information 
globalization that affects financial prices rather than a higher degree of market integration. 
20. See id. at 192. 
21. William R. White, Evolving International Financial Markets: Some Implications for 
Central Banks, BIS Working Papers No. 66 (April 1999) at 2. 
22. For the features of net and gross flows of capital, see International Monetary Fund, 
International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and Key Policy Issues (August 2001) at 6-7 
("Although net capital flows provide useful insights about balance-of-payments financing and net 
funding requirements, they can considerably understate the volume and volatility of international 
portfolio rebalancing. Gross flows more closely reflect international transactions and are more 
relevant in terms of their impact on market prices and volatility."). 
23. The Institute of International Finance, Inc., Near-Term Prospects for Emerging Market 
Economies (October 1998). 
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Although the financial crisis has subdued the economic growth in 
emerging economies and private capital flows to these markets net 
capital inflows are expected to be about $160 billion in 2002 which is a 
significant increase from the $80.5 billion in 1999 and the $130 billion 
seen last year but well below the levels of the mid-1990s. 24 Nevertheless, 
gross capital inflows have risen sharply to about six times the level of net 
flows on a global basis since the mid-1980s.25 As such, the growing 
global financial integration has been seen despite financial crisis over the 
decades. 
In the meantime it should be recognized that before strengthening the 
domestic financial system the increase in the volume and volatility of 
international capital flows driven by the capital account liberalization in 
light of financial liberalization has been a factor behind the recent costly 
financial crises. 26 However, some argue that financial globalization along 
with international financial integration will eventually reduce the 
possibility of a financial crisis since it is associated with increasing direct 
investment, which is not so risky as portfolio investment. 27 
By contrast, one argues the recent financial crises have been caused 
mainly by financial market liberalization and deregulation rather than the 
global financial integration. 28 It is worth noting that the period between 
1945 and 1973 was seemingly calm and prosperous since financial 
markets were operated by a stable system of pegged exchange rates 
under the Bretton Woods system, widespread controls over capital flows, 
and strict restrictions on banking activities.29 Arguably, the relaxing of 
24. IMF, supra note 14, at 46; see also IIF, Integrated Approach Proposed for a New Phase of 
Crisis Prevention and Crisis Management to Revive Emerging Market Capital Flows, IIF Press 
Release (April 9, 2002). 
25. IMF, supra note 22, at 7 ("The high level of gross flows relative to net flows suggests that 
countries and regions that have small net capital flows can nevertheless experience substantial gross 
inflows and outflows of capital."). 
26. Barry Eichengreen et al., Liberalizing Capital Movements: Some Analytical Issues, IMF 
Economic Issues No.17 (Feb. 1999) ("It is not financial liberalization that is at the root of the 
problem but rather weak management in the financial sector and inadequate supervision and 
regulation, whose consequences are magnified by liberalization."). 
27. Paul Krugman, Crises: The Price of Globalization, the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City symposium paper for Global Economic Integration: Global Opportunities and Challenges (Aug. 
24-26, 2000) at 104. He stresses although the process of globalization increased the risk of financial 
crisis, the increase in trade as tradeoffs of the policies reducing the risk of financial crisis via costly 
restrictions on capital flows may lead to a reduced likelihood of financial crisis in the long run 
because a depreciation of the currency is likely to have net explanatory effects with increased trade. 
28. Charles Goodhart, Commentary: Crisis: The Price of Globalization, the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City symposium paper for Global Economic Integration: Global Opportunities and 
Challenges (Aug. 24-26,2000) at 108. 
29. Id. at 107. 
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these financial regulations after 1974 brought about not only economic 
benefits but also potential risks of financial crisis.3O 
Another indicator of the increase in financial integration is the creation 
of new financial markets and instruments to facilitate diverse 
transactions around the world. 3! In particular, the offshore markets have 
seen the rise of financial transactions in domestic currencies to be 
conducted abroad although it is argued that the markets generated by the 
providers inducement on the users, due to the financial regulatory 
discrepancies and the differences in the investors perceptions of 
markets32 rather than the fair share of financial innovation. 33 
Furthermore, new financial instruments and financing techniques have 
rapidly developed and grown in response to the desire of market 
participants over the last decades. The advent of asset securitization 
which links banking markets with capital markets has spread to meet the 
needs of financial market participants. This new method of financing 
helps the financial institution or corporations (originators) transform their 
illiquid financial assets into highly liquid securities to improve their 
financial situation and liquidity.34 
This new technique has been used to remodel all the assets such as home 
mortgages, credit card debt, student loans, car loans and equipment 
leases into asset-backed securities. As a result, credit has been expanded 
to consumers and the liquidity or flexibility for lenders with the 
30. Goodhart stresses that there is a need to restructure the framework for regulating banking 
and financial sector s to restrict volatile short-term capital flows rather than as direct control. Id. at 
1l0. 
3J. White, supra note 2J. 
32. Movements of money from the national markets to offshore banking centers have been 
motivated by four factors: the profit incentive, financial privacy and secrecy, tax benefits (tax 
savings/avoidance), and protection of assets from lawsuits and other liabilities. See B. Chad 
Bungard, Offshore Banking in the British Dependencies, 9 TOURO INT'L L. REV. 141, 143-145 
(2001). 
33. Gunter Dufey & T. Chung, International Financial Markets: A Survey, in INT'L 
ANANCE AND INVESTING 3-29 (R. Kuhn ed. 1990) cited in Scott & Wellons, supra note 4, at 7. 
34. Securitization refers to the process by means of which primary creditors (originators) 
transfer a diversified, segregated illiquid income producing pool of assets (underlying assets) to a 
third party (special purpose vehicle) to transform and restructure these underlying assts and sell them 
into tradable equity or debt instruments. The means by which these transformation and restructuring 
are accomplished include pooling, unbundling, repackaging and refinancing of existing financial 
assets into securities or instruments that can be sold to and traded by investors in capital markets. See 
Tamara Frankel, SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED ANANCING, ANANCIAL ASSETS 
POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES, Vol. I, 3 (1999). For example, a special purpose 
vehicle (entity) purchases a pool of car loans from the creditor, using money it got by the sale of 
securities that are collateralized by the loans. As a result, interest and principal payments on thecar 
loans are used to pay interest and principal on the asset-backed notes. 
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modulation for investors has been getting greater. 35 Likewise, derivative 
instruments have developed to meet the market participants' needs to 
repackage credit risk into discrete bundles thus increasing the debt 
market liquidity together with the improvement of the participants' 
balance sheets. 
According to the recent data, at end of 2000 over-the-counter derivatives 
markets comprise $95 trillion in notional principal and daily aggregate 
global turnover rose to about $1.4 trillion.36 As recognized, financial 
derivatives have created considerable benefits by allowing investors to 
unbundle and redistribute diverse risks such as foreign exchange, interest 
rate, market and default risks thereby contributed to the improvement of 
market liquidity and increase in the capacity of the financial system to 
bear risk and intermediate capita1.37 
However, there is a concern that heavy reliance on new and innovative 
financial techniques and instruments can cause a serious turbulence 
resulting in financial panics and banking crisis.38 Although securitization 
can create several benefits in the financial market it also raises some 
potential risks particularly to the banking system. Most importantly, a 
financial institution may be in big trouble when the originator could not 
achieve a true sale of the assets and recognize the incurred losses when 
the assets cease to reform subsequently.39 Also, potential risks arise when 
banks in pursuit of a favorable market reception for the securitized assets 
may tend to sell off the highest quality assets despite their retention of 
lower quality assets and thereby increase the average risk in the 
remaining portfolio. 40 
Securitization may also raise systemic risks leading to the increase in the 
fragility of the financial system in both national and international 
contexts as long as it reduces the proportion of financial assets and 
liabilities held by banks in countries where the variable minimum reserve 
requirement system control the central banks operation.41 Furthermore, 
various securitization plans have been introduced to reduce the third 
35. Diana B. Henriques, The Brick Stood Up Before. But Now?, The New York Times (Mar. 
10,2002) at § 3, Page I, Column l. 
36. IMF, supra note 22, at 30. 
37. IMF, supra note 14, at 79. 
38. [d. at 83. 
39. Basel Committee Report on Asset Transfers and Securitization (Sept. 1992) at 5. 
40. [d. at 6. 
41. Under the system, a country's central bank can control the domestic money supply by 
raising or lowering the level of minimum reserves, which banks should maintain. The effectiveness 
is reduced with the decrease in the overall level of assets and liabilities held by financial institutions. 
[d. at 7. 
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world debt42 which arose by the loaning of unprecedented sums of money 
from commercial banks in industrial countries to developing nations of 
the third world in the 1970s due to the increase in the reserves resulting 
from an influx of oil-generated deposits by the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).43 
As highlighted in the third world debt crisis of the 1980s, arguably 
securitization plans may be inadequate measures of alleviating the debt 
problem so far as the plans cannot address the debt nation's major 
problem of simply having too much external debt to service in the near 
or medium-term future. 44 
Similarly, derivatives activities can cause the build up of financial 
system fragilities and adverse market dynamics in some cases as 
demonstrated in the recent events of near collapse of the U.S. hedge 
fund, Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM),45 and the Enron 
debacle46 in mature financial markets. The turbulence of the near-failure 
42. Mostly, these plans entail repackaging of debts into a negotiable instrument, such as bond, 
which creditor banks may thereafter sell on the secondary markets to private investors. See Robert 
Plehn, Securitization o/Third World Debt, 23 INT'L LAW, 161,162 (1989). 
43. Alfred J. Puchala, Jr., Securitizing the Third World Debt, 1989 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
137 (1989). 
44. It is argued what the debtor nations really need is for creators to forgive and write down a 
portion of the debt until the situation stabilizes and only thereafter, should securitization of the debt 
be considered. See David W. Leebron, First Things First: A comment on Securitizing Third World 
Debt, 1989 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 173 (1989). 
45. Between January and September 1998, LTCM, one of the largest U.S. hedge funds and 
most important market-makers and providers of liquidation in securities markets, lost almost 90 
percent of its capital. By August 1998, with less than $5 billion of equity capital, LTCM had earned 
a very highly valued counterparty status and highly leveraged trading positions through assembling 
of a trading book that involved about 60,000 trades, including on-balance-sheet positions totaling 
$125 billion and off-balance-sheet positions including about $1 trillion of notional OTC derivative 
positions. In September 1998, the Federal Reserve determined that rapid liquidation of L TCM' s 
trading positions and related positions of other market participants might raise a serious threat to 
already unsettled international financial markets. As a consequence, the Federal Reserve facilitated a 
private sector recapitalization to prevent the collapse of LTCM. See United States General 
Accounting Office (GAO), Long-Term Capital Management: Regulators Need to Focus Greater 
Attention on Systemic Risk, Doc. No. GAO/GGD-OO-03 (Oct. 29, 1998) at I, http:www.gao.gov; 
see also IMF; supra note 14, at 85. 
46. Enron was the main dealer, market-maker, and liquidity provider in major segments of the 
OTC energy derivatives markets, and at end-September 2001, its overall derivatives trading 
liabilities stood at nearly $19 billion. However, its non-recurring charges amounted to $1.01 billion 
for the third quarter of 200 I, and net income was reduced back to 1997 by $586 million, or 20%. 
The collapse resulting from the aggressive use of accounting techniques to mask the Enron's 
excessive leverage and weak earning caused important volatility in financial markets, and 
considerable losses for market participants, which may lead to the risk of systemic consequences for 
financial markets. The plummeting of Enron's shares and credit rating in October 2001 resulted in its 
filing for bankruptcy in two months. Arguably, the Enron case raised three capital market issues: 
inadequate oversight of financial activities of nonfinancial institutions, ineffective private market 
discipline, disclosure, corporate governance and auditing, and misallocation of retirement savings. 
See IMF, Global Financial Stability Report (March 2002) at 41-42. See also, John R. Emshwiller, 
Rebecca Smith & Jonathan Weil, Enron Slashes Profits Since 1997 by 20%, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 
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of LTCM in late 1998 was preceded by the accumulation of a complex 
network of derivatives counterparty exposures, encompassing a high 
degree of leverage in the major markets through late summer 1998 and 
the adverse shift in market sentiment following the Russian crisis in mid-
August 1998.47 In short, the near-collapse raised concerns that heavy 
reliance on innovative financial techniques and undue reliance on 
historical information got the market participants into serious trouble. 48 
As such the virulence of the L TCM turbulence posed the risk of systemic 
impact on global financial system and real economic activities. 
Meanwhile, in late 2001 the collapse of Enron; a non-financial 
institution, energy trading and distribution corporation highlighted the 
uncertainties about the effective functioning of credit-risk transfer 
vehic1es49 used to hedge or take on credit exposures across markets and 
sectors. 50 Even though these financial instruments and markets, which are 
usually driven by regulatory arbitrage offer some benefits to the market 
participants including non-traditional players, the complexity of financial 
transactions and markets have posed new challenges to the market. 51 As 
demonstrated in the Enron case, the vast use of derivatives by way of 
2001, at A3; Enron Corporation, Press Release, Enron Reports Recurring Third Quarter Earnings of 
$0.43 per Diluted Share; Reports Non·Recurring Charges of $1.01 Billion After-Tax; Reaffirms 
Recurring Earnings Estimates of $1.80 for 2001 and $2.15 for 2002 and Expands Financial 
Reporting (Oct. 16,2001) 
www.enron.com/corp/pressroom/release/2001/ene!68-3QEarningsLtr.html. 
47. The Russian tunnoil due to Russia's devaluation and unilateral debt restructuring sparked a 
broad-based reassessment and repricing of risk and large scale deleveraging and portfolio 
rebalancing that cut across a range of global financial markets. See IMF, supra note 14, at 8S. 
48. The Russian crisis deprived the LTCM of its engaging in highly leveraged bets on the 
historical interest rate spread between riskier debt instruments and US Treasury bonds, and thereby 
drove investors' worldwide flight of high risk investments to safety. See Steve Lipin, Matt Murray & 
Jacob M. Schleginger, Bailout Blues: How a Big Hedge Fund Marketed its Expertise And Shrouded 
Its Risks, WALL ST. J., Sep. 2S, 1998, at AI. 
49. Notably, credit risk transfers can foster the efficiency and stability of credit markets overall 
the allocation of capital with the growth of the markets by the separation of credit institution from 
credit risk bearing. Also, they can reduce the concentration of credit risk in financial systems by 
helping nonfinancial corporations take on the credit risks held by banks. Additionally, credit risk 
transfers create the diversification of financial institutions' credit exposures across markets and 
sectors, and facilitate the trading of credit risk, and thus, financial and nonfinancial institutions can 
flexibly manage their credit exposures. Moreover, liquid credit risk transfer markets can enhance 
price discovery and provide price information. See Global Financial Stability Report supra note 46, 
at 38-39. 
SO. Id. at 41. 
S1. Arguably, there are some concerns about these instruments and markets. First, they reduce 
transparency regarding the institutional distribution of credit risk and its concentration. Second, they 
may create or magnify channels, which help credit events-associated distress spread across 
institutions and markets. Third, these instruments are not seemingly regulated as well as banks, and 
not necessarily have the experience required to price properly and manage these risks. Finally, the 
mechanism of credit risk transfer augments the potential for mispricing and misallocation of capital 
by adding the leveraged instruments to the total amount of credit. [d. at 39. 
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credit risk transfers raised concerns over potential systemic risks. 52 
Moreover, the Enron case called for "much greater transparency and the 
increased completeness in the accounting treatment of derivatives"53 
since it seemingly engaged in manipulative accounting transactions to 
minimize financial statement losses and volatility, augmented profits and 
avoided adding debt to the balance sheet. 54 At the time, there were no 
requirements to disclose information about its risks to counterparties, nor 
the market price conditions thus the derivatives activities have not been 
regulated in spite of the size of the derivatives market, its complexities 
and pivotal role in the energy markets under the 2000 Commodity 
Futures Act. 55 
Under the circumstances, the same financial techniques used for the asset 
securitization were arguably applied to "construct the elaborately 
camouflaged and booby trapped partnerships" resulting in the Enron's 
collapse. 56 That is, the non-consolidated special purpose entities 
(vehicles) were used to hedge certain Enron investments in its 
manipulations. However, it should be recognized that the problem in the 
Enron case is not the securitization, a process of creating asset-backed 
securities but the more Enron-like uses of structured finance. 57 Arguably, 
Enron's abuse of special purpose vehicles posed fundamental questions 
whether its SPV transactions transferred risks of the hedged assets owned 
by Enron to others 58 because of the SPVs' inability to perform their 
hedges resulting from the simultaneous fall in Enron's asset and stock 
values. 59 In this sense, the Enron collapse has not been caused directly by 
52. Allan Greenspan stresses that despite providing of greater flexibility to the financial 
system, due to the complexity, the counterparties could get vulnerable to serious risk that "they do 
not currently recognize, and hence these instruments potentially expose the overall system if 
mistakes are large." See Allan Greenspan, Testimony before the Committee on Financial Services, 
U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 27,2002) at 8. 
53. See id. 
54. As a consequence, the Enron's credit rating was damaged, and thus its credibility in energy 
trading business was hurt. See Report of Investigation by the Special Investigation Committee of the 
Board of Directors of Enron Corporation (Feb. I, 2002) at 4, 36, 68, 78, 97. 
55. Global Financial Stability Report, supra note 46, at 41. However, the U.S. Congressional 
Hearings have affIrmed that certain energy derivatives activities do not fall into the categories that 
are exempted from key regulatory provisions under the act. 
56. Henriques, supra note 35. 
57. [d. (quoting law professor Ronald Gilson that "Enron gives a very useful tool a bad name 
for no reason. Structured finance is used for a zillion different and worthwhile purposes. The 
problem is Enron used it to create a structure that was genuinely not transparent, to hide things."). 
58. Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron, and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in 
Corporate Structures, 7 (July 2002), available at http://ssm.comlabstracCid=306820; see also 
Henriques, supra note 35 (quoting law firm partner David Eisenberg that "securitization is about 
transferring risk to others - and Enron only appeared to be doing that, when in reality they were 
retaining the risk themselves"). 
59. Steven L. Schwarcz, STRUCTURED FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
ASSET SECURITIZATION § I :1, at n. 41 (3nl. ed. 2002). 
12
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 10 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol10/iss1/7
2004) INT'L FINANCE & STATE SOVEREIGNTY 177 
the new financial techniques and instruments but rather by a partly 
ineffective private market discipline, disclosure, corporate governance, 
and inadequate accounting rules should be blamed for the Enron case.60 
Consequently, any regulatory re-evaluation needs to keep in mind a long-
term perspective so that market participants can take advantage of the 
everlasting financial innovation in the age of the information economy. 
Additionally, financial institutions need to strengthen credit risk 
management practices to foster their review of new financial instruments. 
Needless to say, the market participants' attention to the lessons from the 
recent episodes and adoption of the adequate policies and controls will 
substantially prevent or minimize the risks of repeating similar excess in 
the near future. 61 
C. FINANCIAL DEREGULATION 
As noted, financial regulators have responded to the evolution of 
financial markets which are propelled by the competition among 
financial service providers. However, the regulatory authorities are 
continuously getting behind the structural changes in the financial 
services industry and thereby react to immense pressures by relaxing the 
financial regulations or implementing new regulations 
Despite the regulators efforts, the increasing complexity of financial 
services transactions involving the cross-institutional and cross-border 
activities has reduced the effectiveness of financial regulation thus 
eroding statutory and physical barriers between financial sectors and 
jurisdictions which lead to regulatory changes and convergence of 
financial regulatory standards in response to the regulatory arbitrage. 
These structural trends have blurred traditional distinctions between 
banking and other types of financial activities resulting in "one-stop" 
shopping for the customers of the financial services industry and a 
concentration of financial services in larger institutions through merges 
and acquisitions. As such, there has been remarkable convergence of 
banking and financial sectors. 
The recent repealing of the Glass-Steagall Act (Section 20), which 
prohibited banks from engaging in securities underwriting, under the 
Financial Modernization Act of 1999 (the Gramme-Leach-Bliley Act) in 
60. Global Financial Stability Report, supra note 46, at 41. 
61. Richard Spillenkothen, Testimony before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
of the Committee on Government Affairs, U.S. Senate 6 (Dec. 11,2002). 
13
Pak: Int'l Finance & State Sovereignty
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004
178 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. 10 
the U.S.,62 and the dismantling of Japan's statutory separation of banks, 
securities firms, and trust banks63 are examples of the new regulatory 
approach to the structural trends.64 
Moreover, international competitIOn between national regulatory 
authorities based on regulatory discrepancies65 has intensified the 
pressure for deregulation of financial markets in the domestic arena. As a 
result, the international pressures along with globalization of financial 
markets spurred the domestic financial liberalization. 66 This competitive 
deregulation and liberalization process have removed the anti-
competitive regulatory restnctIOns, and brought the increased 
competition for the financial market industry resulting in efficiency and 
lowered costs in the financial services sector.67 The financial market 
participants enjoy net benefits from both lower prices for the financial 
services and the improvements in quality and access to new financial 
instruments through deregulation and liberalization. 68 
In the meantime, there are some concerns about the potential risks and 
other shortcomings raised by financial deregulation.69 In short, the issues 
fall into broad categories including financial market volatility, resulting 
from the large swings in financial market prices, debt build-ups and asset 
62. Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (repealed 1999); and Gramme-Leach-Bliley Act § 
101 (a). 
63. In light of the financial "Big Bang," the Law Amending related laws for Financial System 
Reform amended over 21 laws including the Securities and Exchange Law, Banking Law, and 
Insurance Law (Law No. 107 of 1997). See Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, The Japanese Banking Crisis: 
Some Historical and Regulatory Aspects, Y.B. OF INT'L FIN. & ECON. L., 205, 217 (1999). 
64. At the extreme, the regulatory trends are toward the German-style "universal banking," in 
which banks are allowed directly to underwrite securities and invest in equities of nonblank 
institutions. See Richard J. Herring & Robert E. Litan, FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE 
GLOBAL REGULATION 10-11(1995). 
65. Differences in regulatory constraints between national financial systems have driven the 
shift of financial activities from one location to another than to accomplish their intended goals in 
some cases. See id. at 20. Such cases demonstrate that the regulators need to anticipate to the 
providers' circumvention of the regulation through the financial innovation, and thereby react by 
new regulation or deregulation. In particular, deregulation has played an important role in 
stimulating financial innovation while innovation has spurred financial deregulation. In short, 
financial innovation and regulation are mutually reinforcing. 
66. For example, Japan's financial liberalization in the early 1980s resulted from the United 
States' pressures for Japan to make its financial services industry effective. See K. Osugi, Japan's 
Experience of Financial Deregulation since 1984 in an International Perspective (BasIe: Bank for 
International Settlements, Jan. 1990) cited in OECD, Regulatory Reform in the Financial Services 
Industry: Where Have We Been? Where Are We Going?, FIN. MKT. TRENDS, No. 67 (June 1997) 
at 36. 
67. OECD, supra note 57, at 53. While financial deregulation has created gains from efficient 
resource allocation such as the improved capacity of consumers and private businesses to allocate 
their spending over time thanks to increased capital mobility, it has also raised extensive changes in 
the financial and macro-economic environment. Id. at 59-63. 
68. Id. at 56. 
69. Id. at 63-75. 
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price bubbles preceded by flexibility of available financial instruments 
and the increased access to credit, banking sector problems, and recent 
international debt problems due to international capital flows. 
However, it is argued that the costs and risks of deregulation can be 
outweighed by its benefits if only deregulation is appropriately 
implemented and entailed by necessary policy reforms affecting financial 
incentives.70 More importantly, the financial deregulation process should 
be accompanied by proper reform efforts such as prudential supervision 
and regulation of financial markets to ensure financial stability. In this 
regard, the regulatory competition can focus on the quality of regulation 
such as its ability to deliver results in terms of financial efficiency and 
stability rather than the regulatory laxity.71 
D. CONVERGENCE OF GLOBAL STANDARDS 
There have been some debates over whether the cross-national 
convergence of regulatory policy is desirable by the pressure of 
globalization. Arguably, globalization pushing the elimination of all 
barriers and differences 72 among nations and cultures has brought sharing 
same values accompanied by the convergence73 of economic and political 
systems despite differences between countries with market economies. 74 
In particular, the financial globalization has caused policy convergence, 75 
a general convergence of policy goals, policy instruments, and policy 
70. /d. at 75. 
71. Wendy Dobson & Pierre Jacquet, FINANCIAL SERVICES LIBERALIZATION IN THE 
WTO 112 (1998). 
72. However, some argue that globalization is misunderstood as "the promotion of 
homogeneity across the face of the earth as a bulldozer. [Gllobalization is a technological and 
telecommunications revolution, a phenomenon of the information age, which will not necessarily 
erase all differences and barriers between nations and cultures." See Douglas M. Branson, The Very 
Uncertain Prospect of "Global Convergence" in Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 
321, 326-327 (200 I). 
73. As for the meaning of convergence, one defines it as "the process of applying increasingly 
similar rules to a given situation in different jurisdictions, and is closely related to the harmonization 
and approximation of laws." See Andrew M. Whittaker, Tackling Systemic Risk on Markets: Barings 
and Beyond, in THE FUTURE FOR THE GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKET 259, 261 (F. Oditah 
ed. 1996). Similarly, convergence is described as "the process by which the rules, regulations, or 
political institutions governing economic activity in different countries become more similar." See 
Henry Laurence, Spawning the SEC, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.647, 649 (1999). 
74. Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, CORNELL INT'L L.J. 429, 
465-469 (1997) (arguing that sharing the same values promotes "similar expectations and a common 
ground for understanding" and thereby creating the closer relationship in human society). 
75. Policy convergence is composed of different dimensions including policy goals, "a coming 
together of intent to deal with common policy problems," policy instruments, "the institutional tools 
available to administer policy, whether regulatory, administrative or judicial," and policy style, "a 
more diffuse notion signifying the process by which policy responses are formulated." See C.J. 
Bennett, What is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?, 21 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 215,219 (1991). 
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style. Namely, in response to the financial globalization, the international 
cooperation has produced the widespread adoption of similar regulatory 
technique and harmonized global standards by way of negotiated and 
multinational agreements among different national regulatory 
authorities. 76 
While the convergence advocates note that the global convergence does 
not necessarily imply the convergence of identical regulatory standards 
and structures among different nations, they emphasize the convergence 
of basic values and fundamental systems to promote the reliance on 
market forces thus attracting international businesses and increasing 
economic benefits.77 
In this regard, one of the most controversial debates in the field of 
international economic law concerns the desirability of international 
cooperation. Explaining the relationship between internationalization and 
public choice, one of the proponents for international cooperation 
advocates that "international cooperation is likely to be welfare-
improving in the majority of contexts, though the exact nature of that 
cooperation must vary from one subject to another."78 This advocate 
identifies several reasons why international cooperative efforts should be 
encouraged.79 First, the increasing inability of national authorities to 
regulate transnational activities and the unsuccessful non-cooperative 
strategies need international cooperation. Second, international 
cooperation is desirable and successful because of the increase in welfare 
associated with cooperation in trade liberalization under the WTO 
despite its value-subtracting cooperation. Third, even if international 
cooperation can be welfare-reducing, the argument for cooperation may 
be strengthened since the cooperation allowed nations to consider a 
broader range of interests thus producing a remarkable growth in trade 
and welfare. 
76. One describes this convergence process as "negotiated convergence" because it is the 
byproduct of extensi ve negotiation among different regulatory authorities and the usual 
compromises and trade-offs inherent in bargaining. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael 
Taylor, Convergence and Competition: The Case of Bank Regulation in Britain and the United 
States. 20 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 595, 597-598 (1999). 
77. Laurence, supra note 73, at 649-650; see also Seita, supra note 73, at 466-469. 
78. Andrew T. Guzman, Public Choice and International Regulatory Competition. 90 GEO. 
L.J. 971, 972-974 (2002). By contrast, Stephan and O'Hara's skepticism identifies about the 
potential hazards of international cooperation resulting from the probability and the costs of welfare-
reducing international agreements through facilitating transfer payments and logrolling. See Paul B. 
Stephan, The Political Economy of Choice of Law. 90 GEO. LJ. 957, 960-961 (2002); Erin A. 
O'Hara, Economics. Public Choice. and the Perennial Conflict of Law. 90 GEO. LJ. 941,948-956 
(2002). 
79. Guzman, supra note 78, at 978-979. 
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To support the argument, the international cooperation advocate asserts 
the determination of the appropriate level of cooperation when it should 
be used.80 In particular, it is worth noting that when the other levels of 
cooperation fail, supranational standards and regulations should be 
alternatively taken into account because of their potential to reduce the 
cost of transfers among nations which makes it easier to reach an 
agreement.8l 
In contrast to the international cooperation advocate, some argue that 
international cooperative efforts have faced a great degree of skepticism 
at the national level because the efforts lack the political accountability 
of elected and appointed officials at national and local levels.82 Thus, the 
domestic decision-makers or bureaucrats face severe constraints on their 
behavior as opposed to international lawmakers thereby bearing some 
political accountability for their choices.83 Also, international cooperative 
efforts have brought about skepticism because they lack the transparency 
of local lawmaking.84 Due to the lack of transparency, a great rate of 
economic rents and returns in excess of what is necessary to keep a given 
resource from transferring to other occupation, have been sought all over 
the world. As such, bureaucrats may foil the cooperative efforts unless 
they have chances to engage in rent seeking thereby decreasing 
transparency and engaging in turf protection. 85 Furthermore, the 
pessimistic perspective on cooperative efforts classifies into two 
categories the reasons why international cooperation may produce 
undesirable outcomes. 
80. See id. at 980-983 (providing several levels of cooperation that are available: first, a 
laissez-faire system as the lowest level of cooperation, second, a nation's setting of the terms of its 
interactions with other nations through a unilateral selection of choice-of-law rules, third, an 
agreement on choice-of-law rules without any comments on substantive rules, fourth, harmonization 
of substantive laws as a higher level of cooperation, alternatively, supranational standards and 
regulations as the highest level of cooperation). 
81. See id. at 983 (taking as the best examples of this strategy, international trade and 
international intellectual property under the WTO, and international banking regulation through the 
Basel Accord). 
82. Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmoniwtion in International 
Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743, 752 (\999) (arguing that this is because "[n]o mechanism 
exists for voters to pass judgment on the international lawmakers. At best, they can vote for the 
domestic governments that in tum 
chose the drafters of international agreements."). 
83. Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and 
Legitimacy, \ 7 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 681, 682, 732 (1996-97). 
84. See id. at 699 (positing that "interest groups tend to have somewhat lower costs of 
expressing their preferences to executives engaged in international lawmaking than in conveying 
their wishes to domestic legislators, and that the general public has higher monitoring costs with 
respect to international lawmaking"). 
85. Stephan, supra note 83, at 706. 
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First, negotiators may give excessive weight to the preferences of private 
groups with unrepresentative preferences but especially low 
organizational costs. Second, persons with an interest in the institutions 
established or promoted by international cooperation may seek the 
adoption of agreements that expand the competence, discretion, and 
authority of those institutions at the expense of desirable regulatory 
outcomes.86 
More importantly, this pessinustic point of view on the cooperative 
efforts points out the costs of cooperation and welfare-reducing 
agreements. 87 The grounds for welfare-reducing international cooperation 
fall into three categories. 
First, the negotiators have powerful incentives to achieve some kind of 
agreement regardless of substantive outcome.88 Association with a 
concluded agreement brings prestige opportunities to offer interpretation, 
and invitation to participate in subsequent negotiations. Second, the 
legislatures face take-it-or-Ieave-it choices that limit their power to shape 
what gets adopted. Thus, they are [unlikely] to reject agreements that 
may reduce overall welfare. 89 Third, the difficulty of reaching the 
sustained level of agreement necessary to permit frequent updates of 
existing agreements pushes negotiators toward delegations of lawmaking 
authority to international institutions.90 
Even if international cooperative efforts have been remarkably increasing 
over the last decades, there is still concern that international cooperation 
has pitfalls and should be approached cautiously.91 As noted, the lack of 
86. Stephan, supra note 78, at 960-961. 
87. In general, the costs incurred by a potentially undesirable agreement, discounted by the 
likelihood of the structure producing such an agreement is greater than the benefits of a potentially 
desirable agreement, discounted by the likelihood of a particular institutional structure achieving it. 
See id.at 960. 
88. In response to this argument, Guzman advocates that this does not show an important 
ground to resist international cooperation for three reasons. First, as long as a pro-agreement bias 
exists among the negotiators as agents for the nations, the principals have an incentive to correct for 
this through a change in the negotiators. Second, there are many ways to "reach a deal" without 
imposing important commitments on a nation under international law. Third, despite a bias toward 
some kind of agreement, the bias may be helpful rather than harmful in light of the overall 
negotiating structure of international law, under which the consent of every participating nation is 
required for international agreements in accordance with the unanimity rule. See id. at 974-975. 
89. As for this argument, Guzman casts doubts for two reasons. First, the negotiators are 
controlled by the executive, and thus the nation has a chance to shape the content of the agreement. 
Second, the legislature's decision to accept a take-it-or-Ieave-it offer does not imply that it is not 
likely to approve a welfare-reducing agreement. See id.at 975-976. 
90. [d. at 961. In contrast to this concern of entrenchment by international bureaucrats, 
Guzman claims that the concern is a concern about the form of cooperation rather than its merit 
since many forms of cooperation can proceed without formal institutions. See id. at 975. 
91. Paul B. Stephan, supra note 83. 
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transparency, the lack of political accountability and the rent-seeking 
may impede convergence.92 Here, it should be noted that there is no trend 
to homogeneity in world economies as opposed to the globalization 
thesis. Moreover, modernization and Westernization are not converging 
trends in contrast to the underlying premise of global convergence 
scholarship implies. 93 
With respect to the convergence thesis, some argue that nations still 
pursue diverse policy choices. In this regard, one examines the 
hypothesis that the Keynesian welfare policies of West European nations 
will be eroded by the international financial integration and concludes 
that notwithstanding the increased exertion of capital integration over the 
past two decades, "powerful pressures for convergence in economic 
policies,"94 such convergence has not happened, and that "the evidence 
on fiscal policy conflicts sharply with the convergence thesis."95 Another 
argues that "the international outcome [of financial integration] is solidly 
rooted in domestic policy dilemmas and distributional debates, "and that 
"[financial] markets remained distinctively national."96 
Nevertheless, the global convergence fueled by the process of 
globalization has grown significantly in international economic affairs. 
As a matter of fact, international cooperative efforts have brought up the 
less complete global convergence of harmonization in regulatory 
standards. Therefore, international convergence of regulatory standards 
and legal rules has increasingly become a noticeable trend in the global 
finance. Thus, for capital market concerns, several international forums 
have been created to cooperate in setting minimum standards among 
various international bodies as a process of the global convergence.97 
92. In addition, one indicates as one of the grounds the pretentious "we know better" tone of 
much of the convergence advocacy. See Branson, supra note 72, at 339. 
93. John Gray, FALSE DAWN: THE DELUSIONS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 169-170 
(1998) cited in Branson, supra note 72, at 349. It is argued that for much of the world, modernization 
and Westernization have become diverging trends or, indeed, anathema to one another. 
94. Geoffrey Garrett, Capital Mobility, Trade, and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy, 
49 INT'L ORG. 657, 657 (1995). 
95. See id.at 659. 
96. Andrew C. Sobel, Domestic Choices, INTERNATIONAL MARKETS 19, 143 (1994), 
cited in Laurence, supra note 73, at 652-653. 
97. The international cooperation and coordination in global finance have been underway 
through the Basel Committee, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), 
the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (lAIS), the International Accounting 
Standards Committee (IASC), the Joint Forum, and the Financial Stability Forum. Moreover, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMp) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) have played a major role in helping assess the fragilities of global markets 
and enhancing institutional coordination and exchange of information. See Joseph J. Norton, A "New 
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBALIZATION FOR STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY 
A. THE BACKDROP 
[Vol. 10 
The process of globalization has transformed the traditional view of 
international law for the nation-state sovereignty, which is associated 
with exclusive territorial jurisdiction since the Treaty of Westphalia in 
1648.98 The traditional notion of the state sovereignty has been subject to 
critical scrutiny due to the rapid financial integration, the growth of 
regionalism around the globe, and the advent of international regulatory 
regimes. 99 
In recent years, the impact of globalization on the dominance and 
autonomy of nation-state has been increasingly the subject of heated 
debate cutting across various disciplines. Some observers stress a need 
for "relocation of authority," both to the international level for problems 
for which the share is too small to operate effectively, and to the sub-
state level, for tasks for which it are too large. loo Others claim that states 
have lost sovereign authority in the face of independent regulatory 
activities by business association. 101 This results from "the alleged loss of 
functions to international institutions, to pressure to develop power to 
regional movements demanding autonomy or secession, and to the 
International Financial Architecture?"- Reflections on the Possible Law-Based Dimension, 33 
INT'L LAW 891,899-904 (1999). 
98. Since the 17th century, the modern state has been the dominant entity in domestic and 
international affairs both in terms of power and regulatory authority. See John Ruggie, Territoriality 
and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 47 INT'L ORG. 139, 174 (1993). 
99. Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization, Law, and the Transformation of Sovereignty: The 
Emergence of Global Regulatory Governance, 6 GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. J. 425, 426 (1999) 
(arguing that "[t]he notion of a single unified system of internal sovereignty [the development of the 
internal coherence within the nation-state] has become increasingly problematic in a global political 
economy surrounded by islands of sovereignty, rather than by a single, central decisionmaking 
authority"). Jayasuriya claims that the development of this "complex sovereignty" reflects the 
transformation and reconstitution of the notion of nation-state and sovereignty in the light of 
financial globalization. Id 
100. P. Kennedy, PREPARING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 131 (1993). 
101. L. A. Kahn, The Extinction of Nation-State, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 197 (1992) 
(noting the gradual ending of the primacy of the traditional state); see also Jan A. SchoIte, Global 
Capitalism and the State, 73 INT'L AFFAIRS 427, 444-445 (1997) (arguing that "the end of state 
sovereignty does not mean the end of state"). Scholte recognizes that the more powerful states have 
retained important influence in contemporary global finance. ld 
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difficulty of effectively controlling large multinational enterprises, the 
flows of international finance and of information and ideas. "102 
The new medievalists proclaiming the end of the nation-state emphasize 
the role of non-state actors with multiple allegiances and global 
network 103 while liberal internationalists lO4 recognize a need for 
international rules and institutions, constituted by a legally binding 
treaty, with expanding powers of governance to solve states' problems. 
The adherents of new medievalism also conceive the development of a 
complex and varied international order with multiple layers and actors 
that is more akin to the order of medieval times. lOS 
In this sense, this view is construed as "a back-to-the-future model of the 
twenty-first century."I06 
Another view of the "chaos paradigm" specifically addresses the decline 
of nation-state as an institution. I07 This view highlights the sharp rise in 
tribal, ethnic and religious conflict, the rapid increase in the activities of 
international criminal mafia organizations, the proliferation of biological, 
chemical and nuclear weapons, the increase of international terrorism, 
the problem of massive refugee flows and the appearance of acts of 
genocide and "ethnic cleansing."los 
I 02. Peter Malanczuc, Globalization and the Future Role of Sovereign State, in 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW WITH A HUMAN FACE 46-47 (Friedl Weiss et a!., eds. 
1998). 
103. Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, 76 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, No. I (Jan./Feb. 1997) at 64 
(describing a shift away from the state-up, down, and sideways----to supra-state, sub-state, and 
above all, non·state actors"). 
104. Michael Zuern, From Independence to Globalization. in THE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 235 (Walter Carlsnaes et a!., eds. 2000). The liberal 
internationalism requires a centralized rule-making authority, a hierarchy of organizations, and 
universal membership: the United Nations is one of the standard or classical models of international 
institutions. 
105. See generally Samuel Huntington, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATION AND THE 
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996). 
106. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order. 76 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, No.5 (Sep.! 
Oct. 1997) at 183. Slaughter pointed out two central weak points of the new medievalism: first, 
private power does not take the place of state power; second, "the power shift is not a zero-sum 
game [because] [a] gain in power by non-state actors does not necessarily translate into a loss of 
power for the state." See id. at 184. 
107. See Huntington, supra note 105. 
108. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, OUT OF CONTROL (1993); see also Daniel Moynihan, 
PANDAEMONIUM: ETHNICITY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. cited in Huntington. supra 
note II, at 35. This is a world in anarchic and chaotic world characterized by the breakdown of 
governmental authority, the dismemberment and fragmentation of states and the appearance of 
"failed states": Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, Afghanistan, and Yugoslavia. See G.B. Helman 
et a!., Saving Failed Sates. 89 FOREIGN POLICY 21 (1992); see also Oscar Schachter, The Erosion 
of State Authority and its Implications for equitable Development. in International Economic Law 
with a Human Face 40-42 (F.Weiss et a!.. ed .• 1998). 
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At the other extreme, adherents of the realist tradition of "international 
regime" continue to stress the primacy of the nation-state as the central 
actor. 109 This view has pointed out, in some instances; globalization has 
led to the expansion of government authority and government spending 
instead of diminishing the authority of the nation-state. ItO 
By contrast, the adherents of "transgovernmentalism" recognizes that 
"[t]he state is not disappearing, it is dis aggregating into its separate, 
functionally distinct parts.,,111 That is to say, that trans-governmentalism 
notes the frequent interaction among decentralized government agencies 
(global networks) all over the world rather than formal negotiation. This 
point of view argues that "[r]egular interaction with foreign colleagues 
offers new channels for spreading democratic accountability, 
governmental integrity, and the rule of law."112 The proponent claims that 
trans governmental networks represent "a blueprint for the international 
architecture of the 21 51 century." 113 
However, some critiques acknowledge the significance of networks, but 
hold them as accountable for the reduced transparency and impediment 
to political accountability. 114 Others fear that networks may reinforce the 
dominance of the major economic powers, particularly inequalities 
between advanced industrial countries and less developed economy 
because networks are club-like. ll5 
109. Robert Gilpin, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
(1975). 
I 10. Geoffrey Garnett, Capital Mobility, Trade and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy, 
14 INT'L ORG. 683 (\995). 
Ill. Slaughter, supra note 106, at 184. Slaughter argues that "[d]isaggregating the state permits 
the disaggregation of sovereignty as well, ensuring that specific state institutions derive strength and 
status from participation in transgovernmental order." Id. at 196. Trans-governmentalism is based on 
international relations theory. In particular, Keohane and Nye initiated the exploration of "trans-
governmental relations" to demonstrate how trans-governmentalism promoted international 
organizations in the early 1970s. See Robert Keohane & Joseph Nye, Trans-governmental Relations 
and International Organizations, 27 WORLD POLITICS 39 (1974). 
112. See id. at 186. According to Slaughter, transgovernmentalism is arguably more effective 
and potentially more accountable than any other alternatives since it leaves the control of 
government agencies in the hands of "national citizens" rather than "supranational bureaucracies" 
answerable to no one in the liberal internationalism. She asserts that although new medievalism 
attracts "states' rights enthusiasts" and "superanationalists," it could easily reflect the worst of both 
worlds.ld. 
1l3. See id. at 197. 
114. See generally Robert Howse, Regulatory Cooperation and the Problem of Democracy, in 
TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION 469 (George A. Bermann et a\., ed. 2000). 
115. David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. In!'1 L. & 
Pol. 335, 412 (2000) (questioning whether exploring the "disaggregation of the state and the 
empowerment of diverse actors in an international civil society without asking who will win and 
who will lose by such an arrangement" is prudent). 
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B. GLOBAL CHALLENGES TO NATIONAL FISCAL SOVEREIGNTY 
1. Taxation: Sovereign Authority 
Historically, a state's fiscal legislation was construed as a national issue 
in character. 116 In the most antique forms, taxation regimes have evolved 
from two competing concepts that "every man payeth equally for what 
he useth,"117 and that "the subjects of every state ought to contribute 
towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in 
proportion to their respective abilities. liB These two divergent notions 
have been respectively considered as the benefit, and the ability-to-pay 
theories. 119 
Under the backdrop, fiscal authority is an essential constituent to any 
government since it provides revenue for national cost and expenditure 
that enables a nation to maintain the existence and operation of the 
government benefit its citizens and compete with foreign countries. 120 
Because taxes are one feature of national cost and expenditure, taxation 
has been traditionally viewed as the nation-states' sovereignty to levy 
and collect taxes from all entities within their jurisdictions. 121 
In the meantime, the financial globalization has brought up the hot 
academic debate as to whether a nation-state's absolute authority and 
jurisdiction over fiscal matters can continue irrespective of the impact of 
internationalization. Because economic integration and activities across 
borders, and technology advances have made taxation significantly more 
116. Stephen G. Utz, Tax Harmonization and Coordination in Europe and America, 9 Conn. J. 
InCI L. 767, 767-768 (1994) (indicating that traditional tax policy was based on national economic 
systems that seldom affected each other). 
117. Thomas Hobbes, THE LEVIATHAN 239 (Richard Tuck ed. 1991) (1651). 
118. Adam Smith, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH 
OF NATIONS 310 (Edwin Cannan ed. 1925) (1776). 
119. According to the benefit theory, a just tax distributes the tax burden in accordance with the 
distribution of governmental goods and services. See James Buchanan, The Pure Theory of 
Government Finance: A Selected Approach, in ASCAL THEORY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY: 
SELECTED ESSAYS 12 & n. 5 (1960) (1940). By contrast, under the pure ability-to-pay theory, 
those with greater capacity pay more tax. See Smith, supra note 118, at 310. 
120. Frederick Bassinger & Michel Glautier, A REFERNCE GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL 
TAXATION xi (1987) (conceding that any government emphasized historically the significance of 
revenue to raise and maintain armies, and obtain allegiances of its subjects, and that declined 
sovereigns lost the control when the ability to collect taxes ceased); see also Reuven Avi-Yonah, 
Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573, 
1626 (2000) (arguing that tax policies approved by nation's citizens reflect society and quality of life 
that citizens prefer). 
121. Utz, supra note 116, at 772 (describing that nations tax on the basis of traditional legal 
norms regarding sovereigns and their authority over individuals and entities within their borders); 
see also Bassinger & Glautier, supra note 120, at x, xi (noting that jurisdiction extended to 
"geographical boundaries," which defined nation's territory under international norms, and that 
historically, taxation authority is national in character). 
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challenging,122 the traditional concept of state's fiscal sovereignty and 
taxing jurisdiction has been subject to scrutiny.l23 Some observes 
conceded the interdependence between national tax systems and 
international economic relations. 124 Moreover, others have acknowledged 
the impact of international economic integration on domestic tax 
policies. l25 Nevertheless, some argue that no international law limits the 
state's authority to prescribe its fiscal legislations, and thus the nation-
state can maintain its autonomy in fiscal legislation.126 However, the 
realism is that states need to interact with their sovereign global 
neighbors to compete in world trade under the international regulatory 
regime. 
Understandably, the time has come to take account of how the nation-
state can exercise its fiscal sovereignty over individuals and entities in 
the era of the international economic integration. In that context, it 
deserves noting international cooperative efforts in the global economic 
affairs in the wake of the recent worldwide financial turbulence. 
Needless to say, a special attention should be paid to adapt national fiscal 
authority and their taxing jurisdictions to the new financial environment. 
122. Vito Tanzi, Globalization, Technological Developments, and the Work of Fiscal Termites, 
26 BROOK J. INT'L L. 1261 (2001) (arguing that collecting taxes is becoming harder due to a long 
list of "fiscal termites" gnawing at the foundations of taxation regimes: more cross-border shopping, 
the increased mobility of skilled labor, the growth of electronic commerce, the expansion of tax 
heavens, the development of new financial instruments and intermediaries, growing trade within 
multinational companies, and the possible replacement of bank accounts with electronic money 
embedded in "smart cards"). 
123. Timo Virenkentta, Tax Incentives in Developing Countries and International Taxation: A 
Study on the Relationship between Income Tax Incentives for Inward Foreign Investment, in 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND TAXATION OF FOREIGN N ICOME IN CAPITAL-
EXPORTING COUNTRIES 43 (1991) (stating that extent of national fiscal sovereignty became 
subject of controversy). 
124. Vtz, supra note 116, at 770 (noting common belief that national taxes affect international 
business, and are not independent of competitive conditions in global neighbors, thus national tax 
systems should accordingly transnational). 
125. Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, THE JURISDICTION TO TAX IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE FISCAL JURISDICTION 11 (1989) 
(acknowledging that internationalization of trade and increasing mobility of people and capital 
resulted in the assessment of impact of international law in fiscal law); see also Arnold Knechtel, 
BASIC PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIOANL FISCAL LAW 10 (asserting that increased cross-
border movements established a need for modifying tax systems to address new fiscal issues); see 
also Ramon J. Jefferey, THE IMPACT OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY ON GLOBAL TRADE AND 
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION (1999) (indicating that the nature of a state's role requires nation-
states increasingly become aware that it is appropriate for certain international taxation matters to be 
dealt with not at the national, but at the international level, through the international law-making 
process). 
126. THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TAXATION: TEXT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS 24 (Asif H. Qureshi ed. 1994) (asserting that acceptance of state's right to tax 
pursuant to its respective jurisdiction is not limited by international law); see also Bassinger & 
Glautier, supra note 120, at xi (arguing that" ... nations jealously protect their right to tax people and 
objects within their jurisdictions"). 
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2. The Problem with Double Taxation 
Historically, with the establishment of territorial jurisdiction, the nation-
state has adopted its formal tax system while the type and method can 
vary in accordance with its need. 127 The capacity of any government to 
levy and collect taxes from the subjects within its national territory is 
based on one or all of the three rationales: "citizenship"128 based taxation; 
"residence"129 based taxation; "source"130 based taxation. 
However, the expansion of economic activities across border has posed 
challenges to the absolute fiscal authority of states. That is, the 
conventional taxing structure did not face any impediments to the 
exercise of the domestic tax policy when the mobility of labor and 
resources was not easy, but the taxing mechanism has failed to address 
fiscal issues due to the increasing movement of economic activities 
across national borders. 
When entities extend their activities into other jurisdictions, they expose 
themselves to the potential of taxation in an increasingly number of 
jurisdictions. 131 The entity is subject to "double taxation" due to the 
extension of its activities into foreign jurisdictions.132 The problem of 
double taxation is that multiple nations' taxing authorities attempt to 
claim jurisdiction over the same activity or entity results in conflicts of 
law. 133 The conflicting rules resulting from the intersection of the states 
127. See id. 
128. See id. at 37. In a citizenship based fiscal jurisdiction, as long as the entity is a citizen of 
that state, he incurs tax liability. An individual's citizenship is commonly established by the birth 
place while corporations are deemed citizens of the jurisdiction where they are incorporated. [d. at 
37-40. 
129. See id. at 37. In a residence based fiscal jurisdiction, regardless of whether the taxpayer is a 
citizen, simply being a resident of that jurisdiction is single rationale sufficient to incur a tax. An 
individual's residence is based on where he normally lives while the residence of a corporation is 
presumed to be where it was incorporated. However, this is not always the case. [d. at 44. 
130. See id. at 37. In a source based fiscal jurisdiction, where neither citizenship nor residency 
is relevant, if an entity derives income from a source within that jurisdiction, it has incurred tax 
liability therein. Source, as applied to both individuals and corporations, most commonly describes 
the geographic location from where income is derived. [d. at 38, 47 -48. 
131. Bassinger & Glautier, supra note 120, at 151 (indicating that taxpayers may face triple 
taxation: taxes from country of citizenship, residence country, and country where income is 
generated). 
132. OECD, 1992 MODEL DOUBLE TAX CONVENTION, available at 
http://www.oecd.orgldaflfaltreaties.treaty.htm (describing international double taxation as 
imposition of taxes by two or more nations against same income generated by single taxpayer in 
foreign country). 
133. The problem of double taxation is raised when each jurisdiction levies and collects taxes 
from activities and entities within its border as it deems appropriate. See Bassinger & Glautier, supra 
note 120, at 165. 
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attribute to the multitude factors behind tax law, social policy, 
administrative constraints, and political compromise. 134 
Under the dominant approach, the taxation of active business income is 
allocated to the source country, and the passive invest income is 
allocated to the residence jurisdiction. Arguably, in spite of the lack of a 
flrm economic and analytic basis, this basic division has prevailed to the 
present, but it has misrepresented its practicalityYs Notably, the efforts to 
solve the problem of double taxation have been made by both the 
adoption of bilateral treaties and domestic legislation. 136 In particular, 
redressing double taxation at the international level requires the 
cooperation of multiple states to establish agreements in terms of 
treaties.137 Under the circumstances, many observers concede the 
effectiveness of treaties in preventing double taxation. 138 
The initial efforts to prevent double taxation have been asserted to create 
the international tax regime. 139 That is, the regime was arguably 
developed in the 1920s following the League of Nations' study on ways 
to avoid international double taxation. 140 Despite the critics over the non-
existence of supreme body or law in the international tax regime, this 
system has brought a special attention in the age of internationalization 
and international economic integration. Regardless of the advent of 
134. Diane M. Ring, One Nation among Many: Policy Implications of Cross· Border Tax 
Arbitrage, 44 B.C.L. REV. 79, 80-81 (stating that conflicting rules render one of two results: 
taxation or nontaxation). 
135. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Transaction: A Proposal for 
Simplification, 74 TEX L. REV. 1301, 1306-1313 (1996) (reviewing and justifying historical and 
current patterns of taxing active and passive income). 
136. Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.UJ. INT'L L. & POL. 939, 939-941 (2000) 
(asserting that treaties playa less important role in reducing double taxation, and that the problem 
can be solved properly by national legislation). 
137. See id. at 941 (acknowledging that conventional account of double taxation redress 
emphasizes mutual cooperation among states); see also Robert Thornton Smith, Tax Treaty 
Interpretation by the Judiciary, 49 TAX LAW 845, 845-846 (1996); THE PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TAXATION, supra note 126, at 126-127 (noting that effective 
remedial double taxation treaties need negotiations among multiple states). 
138. John F. Avery Jones, Are Tax Treaties Necessary?, 53 TAX L. REV. 1,2-3 (1999) (stating 
that the success of tax treaties is illustrated by treaty proliferation during last 50 years). Under the tax 
treaty network, signatory countries signatory states agree on a maximum of tax rate and how the 
total tax should be allocated among each signatory state. Moreover, the country of residence grants 
an exemption or a credit to the taxpayer for the paid tax on income in another country (foreign-
source income). See Smith, supra note 137, at 845-846. 
139. Some denies the existence of international taxation. See David Rosenbloom, International 
Tax Arbitrage and the "International Tax System", 53 TAX L. REV. 137, 140-141, 166 (2000) 
(asserting that "that system appears imaginary," because in the real world, only the different tax laws 
of various countries exist, and those laws vary greatly from each other). 
140. Avi-Yonah, supra note 135, at 1303-1304 (arguing that "[t]he existence of this regime 
shows that despite each country's claim to sovereignty to in tax matters, it is possible to reach an 
internationally acceptable consensus that will be followed by the majority of the world's taxing 
jurisdictions"). 
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international tax regime, the global cooperative efforts to prevent double 
taxation for last several decades has posed opportunities and challenges 
to the fiscal sovereignty of each nation-state. 
3. Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage 
As the mobility of capital resources becomes easier, taxpayers seek to 
move their resources into low or zero-tax jurisdictions. Conflicts in tax 
rules offer taxpayer's unique opportunities to engage in profitable tax 
planning where their activities are subjected to multi nations' different 
tax rules. As such, taxpayers' ability to take advantage of these 
differences to prevent their income from being taxed anywhere poses 
challenges to the fiscal authority of each country. This is a problem with 
cross-border tax arbitrage. 141 
Furthermore, international economic integration and technological 
advances have propelled the entities' to exploit the differences between 
tax rules. 
Recently, the cross-border tax arbitrage issue has come into sharp focus. 
Some argue that international tax arbitrage is "the planning focus of the 
future," and the natural response of taxpayers to the normal differences 
that occur between any two taxes systems assuming that it does not 
represent egregious abuse of the tax system. 142 It is asserted that the effect 
of tax arbitrage is similar to simply having different tax rates in different 
fiscal jurisdictions. 143 
By contrast, other observers claim that the entities' activities to exploit 
the tax-law conflicts violate the single tax principle: income from cross-
border transactions should be subject to tax just once as applied to double 
taxation and tax evasion. l44 More importantly, the government faces its 
revenue shortfalls resulting from tax avoidance through cross-border tax 
141. Philip R. West, Foreign Law in U.S. International Taxation: The Search/or Standards, 3 
FLA. TAX REV. 147, 171 (1996) (defining cross-border tax arbitrage as taking advantage of 
inconsistencies between different countries' tax rules to achieve a more favorable result than that 
which would have resulted from investing in a single jurisdiction); see also Reuven S. Avi-Y onah, 
Commentary, 53 TAX L. REV. 167, 167 (2000) (describing international tax arbitrage as 
"inconsistent national treatment of the same entity or transactions that can produce multiple tax 
benefits or detriments"). 
142. Rosenbloom, supra note 139, at 166. 
143. ld. at 149. 
144. Avi-Yonah, supra note 141, at 171 (noting that the embodiment of the single tax principle 
in the typical title of the tax treaties "for the prevention of double taxation" <not more than once> 
and "fiscal evasion" <not less than once». "International tax arbitrage is a natural primary target of 
attempts to enforce the single tax rule, because unlike differences in rates, it results from exploiting 
interactions between the laws of two countries that clearly were not intended by either." See id. 172-
173. 
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arbitrage. Governments may move from relatively less efficient taxing 
mechanisms to more efficient mechanisms in response to revenue deficit 
due to tax avoidance. As a result, cross-border tax arbitrage may push up 
governments' marginal cost of funds by forcing increases in taxes that 
are more distortionary than a properly operating income tax system. 145 
However, it is not easy to know what the proper view of cross-border tax 
arbitrage. As a matter of fact, too many inconsistencies and frequent 
changes in nations' tax rules have offered new opportunities tax 
arbitrage, and thus governments have difficulty in dealing with such 
arbitrage through minor legislation. l46 Additionally, the responses to the 
arbitrage issue vary among countries. Under the circumstances, 
addressing cross-border tax is critical challenges to the nations' fiscal 
authority. 147 In this regard, it deserves noting an analysis of cross-border 
tax arbitration by proposing a balancing test for determining the adequate 
treatment of specific cases. 148 
4. Tax Competition or Harmonization 
The current debate and discussion in the international dimension of 
taxation focus heavily on whether tax competition is undesirable. In this 
regard, it is argued that global cooperative efforts should be made toward 
international tax harmonization. Indeed, many scholars and experts have 
figured out the nature and effects of tax competition. Others have 
emphasized the desirability and feasibility of tax harmonization. 
Moreover, the OECD's effort to curb tax competition has ignited the 
debate. In order to respond to the inquiry, a special attention should be 
given toward adjusting international tax regime without usurping the 
fiscal sovereignty of the nation states. 
Understandably, there is a linkage between globalization and tax 
competition, 149 which can be meant by the use of taxation by 
governments to induce business activities to their jurisdictions. ISO The 
145. Julie Roin, Taxation without Coordination, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61,75 (2002). 
146. See id. at 76. 
147. Daniel Shaviro, Money on the Table?: Responding to Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage, 3 CHI. 
J. INT'L 317, 331 (2002) (arguing that "addressing cross-border tax arbitrage has at least the 
potential to help everyone move in the direction of greater worldwide cooperation, while also 
possibly advancing purely national ends in the here and now"). 
148. Ring, supra note 134, at 136-\39. 
149. Jonathan Talisman, Challenges Facing Tax Policy in the Coming Years, Remarks to the 
National Conference on Federal Taxes (Nov. 7, 2000) (stating that "international tax competition 
occurs when one country provides a tax inducement to attract capital from another country"). 
ISO. Michael A. Livingston, Blum and Klaven at 50: Progressive Taxation, "Globalization," and 
the New Millennium, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 731,742-744 (2000) (stating that globalization encourages 
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mobility of capital resource and business actIvIties driven by 
international economic integration have pushed governments to employ 
new tax mechanisms such as tax incentives to attract foreign 
investment,151 and tax exemptions in response to competitive pressures 
from global neighbors. As such, all entities have extended their activities 
across borders with the reduction of barriers associated with world trade 
liberalization. 
In the meantime, the effects of tax competition are open to hot debate. 
Theoretical arguments indicate the overall positive benefits of tax 
competition on business organizations, tax authorities, and economies. 152 
According to empirical studies, generally foreign direct investment reacts 
positively to lower tax rates, and tax competition tends to have a positive 
impact on attracting foreign investment. 153 More importantly, adherents 
of tax competition assert that tax competition improves government 
efficiency and social welfare, and reduces government waste. 154 
On the other hand, other theoretical and empirical research points to the 
negative outcomes for economies and tax authorities. 155 Some observers 
are doubtful about the positive empirical results, and thereby referring to 
other studies casting questions about the risks of government inefficiency 
and heavier tax burdens on labor. 156 Tax competition contributes to the 
fiscal crisis of the welfare state since the lower tax rates, and other tax 
incentives driven by tax competition result in revenue shortfalls, and 
keep governments from having sufficient funds for social welfare 
tax competition and discourages progressive taxation); see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 120, at 1575-
1579 (arguing that 
globalization creates tax competition that may cause a serious social backlash). 
151. Avi-Yonah, supara note 120, at 1641-1646 (noting that some economists' argument that 
developing countries should engage in the ultimate tax competition by keeping entirely from taxing 
foreign investments, and others' claim that developing countries should not engage in tax 
competition at all by not offering incentives to foreign investment). 
152. See id. at 1591. 
153. James R. Hines, Lessons from Behavioral Responses to International Taxation, 52 NAT'L 
TAX J. 305, 308-313 (1999) (surveying and discussing the empirical studies on foreign direct 
investment). However, there is a concern about the manner of attracting foreign investment. See Avi-
Yonah, supra note 120, at 1643-1648 (discussing problems of recent empirical studies on the 
benefits of tax competition and arguing that developing countries would be better off ceasing tax 
competition). 
154. John Douglas Wilson, Theories of Tax Competition, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 269, 294-298 
(1999) (arguing that tax competition may encourage welfare efficiency despite imperfect 
competition that can push tax rates to zero or "commitment problems" where companies commit to 
keeping operations only for as long as the initial tax subsidies remain, and claiming that tax 
competition encourages government efficiency either by reducing the excessive size of government 
or increasing public welfare through "expenditure competition"). 
155. !d. at 1592. 
156. Avi-Yonah, supra note 120, at 1643-1648. 
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programs. 157 Also, tax competition is arguably considered to violate the 
"capital export neutrality" principle, which holds that companies should 
locate their firms where return on investment is maximized, and that tax 
rates should be immaterial to the profit maximizing decisions of fIrms. 158 
In other words, tax competition violates this principle because it 
encourages companies to locate where they can avoid paying taxes rather 
than where they would promote "worldwide efficiency and growth."159 In 
short, tax competition has arguably resulted in a critical potential for tax 
evasion and avoidance on the income from cross-border portfolio and 
direct investments leading to important tax base erosion and revenue 
defIcit. 160 With this background, governments have been concerned about 
the negative impacts of tax competition, which may reduce the states' tax 
revenue. 
In response to the concerns and requests of its member states,161 the 
OECD initiated a study to address the tax competition issue, and issued a 
report, which identifies the cause and effects of tax competition. 162 This 
Harmful Tax Competition Report describes the effects of "harmful tax 
competition," providing counteractive measures. According to the report, 
harmful tax competition occurs when a country's fIscal jurisdiction 
collects critical income on certain income but has preferential features 
that subject other income to low or no taxation. 163 This regime is viewed 
undesirable since it redirects capital resources and fInancial flows, and 
the corresponding tax revenue from one jurisdiction to another in an 
aggressive bid, which is not an incidental effect of the implementation of 
national policy.l64 The concern is that such actions will interfere with 
other countries' tax systems, causing changes . that may distort "patterns 
of trade and investment and reduce global welfare."165 
157. See id. at 1632-1639. 
158. Karen B Brown, Harmful Tax Competition: The OECD View, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L 
L. & ECON. 311, 311-312 (1999). 
159. [d. 
160. Avi-Yonah, supra note 120, at 1579-1603. 
161. The OECD members are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
162. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, HARMFUL TAX 
COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUES (1998) (hereinafter Harmful Tax 
Competition Report). 
163. See id. at 26. 
164. [d. at 16. 
165. [d. at 14. 
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The Harmful Tax Competition Report has received a special attention 
from commentators. Some argue that the regulation of tax competition 
infringes on the fiscal sovereignty of the nation-state. 166 Also, it should be 
noted that the Harmful Tax Competition Report ignores the national 
taxation features of industrial states and its effect on the economies of 
less-developed countries. 167 By contrast, others point to the revenue 
statistics in the member nations of the OECD, and note that the sustained 
reduction in tax revenue in the countries in the 1990s has pushed the 
OECD and EU to take policy actions against negative effects resulting 
from tax competition. l68 Moreover, the dynamic and interconnection 
between trade globalization and international tax regime is increasing 
pressures for international tax harmonization. l69 Despite strong 
arguments in favor of tax harmonization, there is still a need to take 
account of the impediments to reaching international tax harmonization. 
Even if tax harmonization is desirable, its potential danger should be 
considered. 
As a matter of fact, cooperative efforts have been made to harmonize or 
coordinate national tax rates, particularly in the area of capital income 
taxation. 170 Although the implementation of this agreement remains 
doubtful, the possibility of harmonizing tax bases by development of a 
uniform definition of taxable income has been discussed. 171 
Some point out that the alleged benefits of uniformity stem from two 
quite disparate sources. The first being administrative advantages in 
166. George M. Melo, Comment, Taxation in the Global Arena: Preventing the Erosion of 
National Tax Bases or Impinging on Territorial Sovereignty?, 12 PACE INT'L L. REV. 183, 186-
189 (1998). 
167. Karen B. Brown, supra note 158, at 315-319. 
168. Tanzi, supra note 122, at 1261-1262 (emphasizing that globalization may influence the 
countries' capacity to collect taxes and the distribution of the tax burden). Tanzi notes that "in most 
countries in the 1990s, the tax level has stopped growing .... " Id at 1262. However, some argues that 
there is no evidence that the international economic integration and technological advances have 
reduced the state's capacity to raise taxes, and that the decrease in tax burden is due to "electoral 
resistance as to insuperable difficulty in collecting taxes." See Martin Wolf, Will Technology and 
Global Capital Markets Change the Scope of Government? 21 CATO 1.143,144-145 (1999). 
169. Robert A. Green, Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving Disputes Between Governments: 
A Comparison of the International Tax and Trade Regimes, 23 YALE L. 1. INT'L L. 79, 87-104 
(1998). 
170. Harmful Tax Competition Report, supra note 162, at 23 (stating that tax competition "may 
hamper the application of progressive tax rates and the achievement of redistributive goals"). The 
EU adopted a provisional agreement on how to tax interest income earned by foreign investors. See 
Roin, supra note 126, at 63. 
171. Roin, supra note 147, at 63; see also Shaviro, supra note 149, at 330 (arguing that 
"harmonizing tax bases often makes sense even if tax competition with respect to rate is retained or 
indeed encouraged"). 
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terms of cost reduction and the second source is eliminating cross-border 
tax arbitrage. 172 
At the same time, it is argued that "[a]ny move toward tax base 
harmonization will entail substantial transition costs because a 
harmonized definition of taxable income undoubtedly will differ 
significantly from most if not all current national systems."173 As such, 
tax harmonization cannot be expected where the revenue benefits 
outweigh its social COSt. 174 
Moreover, the critical point to note is that people by nature are concerned 
with the maximization of profits and reduction of costs, and as such the 
competition for capital will continue. 175 As a consequence, the actors' 
efforts to search for low tax jurisdictions will never cease, thereby 
driving international tax competition. In this context, it deserves noting 
one observer's evaluation of the combination of capital mobility and tax 
competition from a global efficiency or equity perspective toward 
balancing the problem of tax competition against democratic countries' 
right to determine the size of their government, and thus developing a 
distinction between harmful and acceptable form of tax competition. 176 
IV. GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL FINANCE 
A. EVALUATING GLOBAL NETWORK GOVERNANCE 
The global economy raises important questions concerning the structure 
of international governance177 systems intended to safeguard markets 
where globalization implies the erosion of national boundaries. In this 
respect, one observer argues that "[r]regulators' power to implement 
national regulations within those boundaries decline both because people 
172. See id. at 63-76. 
173. Id.at87. 
174. Id. at 93-94. 
175. Melo, supra note 166, at 211. 
176. Avi-Y onah, supra note 120, at 1604-1631. 
177. As David Kennedy remarks in a particularly informative discussion, it "has emerged as a 
distinctive motto for international public order, consciously distinguished from 'government' and 
consciously identified with the group of phenomena that are thought to define the late twentieth-
century international condition: globalization, interdependence, the demise of sovereignty, the 
apparent futility of further United Nations institution building, and the emergence of international 
civil society. These writers identify governance as a new, distinct phenomenon: either a defining 
characteristic of the new world order or a prescriptive for resolving its pragmatic challenge, or both. 
'Governance' in this literature, as opposed to 'government' is the complex of more or less 
formalized bundles of rules, roles, and relationships that define the social practices of the state and 
non-state actors interacting in various issue areas, rather than formal interstate organizations[.]" See 
David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International 
Governance, 2 UTAH L.REV. 545, 548, n.4 (1997). 
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can easily flee their jurisdiction and because the flows of capital, 
pollution, pathogens, and weapons are too great and sudden for anyone 
regulator to control."178 
In contrast, the liberal internationalist response to the concern about the 
erosion of state regulatory power is to build a larger international 
apparatus, such as the United Nations system constituted by a legally 
binding treaty, with expanding powers of governance. 179 
With the globalization of economic relations, and increasing 
interdependence among nation-states, there is a growing conflict between 
a conventional notion of territorial state sovereignty and the flow of 
economic activity, which disrupts coherence of the state. In the 
meantime, various agencies and institutions within the state such as 
independent central banks increasingly develop a high degree of 
autonomy and independence reflecting the fragmentation and/or 
desegregation of the nation-state. 180 
As a new system of regulatory networks in the international economy, 
global network governance establishes rules coping with issues that each 
nation already regulates within its territorial boundaries: crime, securities 
fraud, pollution, tax evasion where traditional international law requires 
states to implement the international obligations they incur through their 
domestic law. 181 The adherents of trans-governmentalism argue that the 
enforcement of national law has been more difficult due to globalization 
propelled by information revolution. 182 This view stress regulators' 
potential opportunity to reap the benefits from coordinating their 
enforcement efforts with those of their foreign peers and from ensuring 
that other nations adopt similar approaches. 183 
Likewise, transgovernmentalists assert that the fragmentation and 
desegregation of the domestic order of the nation-state is essential to the 
development of international regulatory governance system. That is to 
say, the global governance of the economy requires the 
internationalization of state agencies and as long as these agencies 
maintain a high degree of independent autonomy. This view claims that 
178. Slaughter, supra note 106, at 192. 
179. Zuern, supra note 104, at 241. Slaughter notes that "globalization thus leads to 
internationalization or the transfer of regulatory authority from the national level to an international 
institution." Liberals are likely to support expanding the power of international institutions to guard 
against the global dismantling of the regulatory state." See Slaughter, supra note 106, at 192-193 
180. For central bank independence, see Jayasuriya; supra note 99, at 439-441. 
181. Slaughter; supra note 106, at 191. 
182. See id. at 191-192. 
183. [d. at 192. 
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the operation of the global economy requires exclusive reform of 
regulatory system at the national level, and the transformation of state 
sovereignty represents the regulatory harmonization through "the 
nationalization of international law." 184 Trans-governmentalism 
highlights that each nation-state will be better able to enforce its 
domestic law by implementing the agreement if foreign counterparts do 
likewise in accordance with regulatory agreements between states that 
are pledges of good faith that are self-enforcing. 1s5 Here is arguably the 
rationale for regulatory harmonization, because laws are binding as 
coercive only at the national level. 186 
By contrast, the new medievalist formula of global governance is 
"governance without government."IS7 However, governance without 
government is governance without power, and government without 
power rarely works. ISS Although the new medievalists are right to point 
out the transformation of the globe through information revolution, they 
neglect the fact that persuasive power of civil society in mobilizing 
public opinion does not take the place of state power. 1S9 
Here are notable examples of the mechanism of global governance in the 
international financial area such as the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (Basel Committee), the International Organization of 
Securities Commission (IOSCO), and the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).I90 
The Basel Committee, an organization composed of 12 central bank 
governors, was created by a simple agreement among the governors 
themselves for a significant reform of international banking system. 191 In 
1988, capital adequacy requirements for all banks were adopted by the 
central bankers of the world's major financial powers under their 
supervision. Its members follow their own rules. Decisions are made by 
consensus and are not formally binding; however, members do 
implement these decisions within their own systems. 
184. 'd. 
185. See id. 
186. Id. 
187. See id. at 195. 
188. Id. 
189. See id. Mathews argues that "[b]business, citizens' organizations, ethnic groups, and crime 
cartels have all readily adopted the network model [while] [g]governments ... are quintessential 
hierarchies, wedded to an organizational form from incompatible with all that the new technologies 
make possible." See Mathews, supra note 103, at 52. 
190. David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International 
Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEXAS INT'L L. J. 281 (1998). 
191. George Walker, INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION: LAW, POLICY AND 
PRACfICE 17-81 (2001). 
34
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 10 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol10/iss1/7
2004] INT'L FINANCE & STATE SOVEREIGNTY 199 
The Basel Committee's authority is often cited as argument for taking 
domestic action. National securities commissioners and insurance 
regulators have followed the Basel Committee's example. The 
International Organization of Securities Commissioners (lOS CO) has no 
formal charter or founding treaty. Its primary purpose is to solve 
problems affecting international securities markets by creating a 
consensus for enactment of national legislation. 192 Its members have also 
entered into information-sharing agreements on their own initiative. 
The International Association of Insurance Supervisors follows a similar 
model, as does the newly created Tripartite Group, an international 
coalition of banking, insurance, and securities regulators the Basel 
Committee created to Improve the supervISIOn of financial 
conglomerates. 193 
Three organizations have much in common in the way of their 
organizing themselves and the manner of their seeking to achieve their 
objectives. l94 All are sub-state actors, informally formed, with flexible 
internal organization and decentralized bureaucracies. They often come 
into operation in secrecy and informality. The institutions manage to 
attain influence through a kind of decentralized enforcement of their 
agreements and through links to international, regional, and national 
financial regulators. 195 
Although the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) is characterized as one of the international governmental 
organizations in the international system, it has played a critical role in 
shaping the architecture of global governance despite its feature of "low-
profile institution."I96 As the successor to the organization to the 
192. Geoffrey Underhill, Keeping Governments Out oj Politics: Transnational Securities 
Market, Regulatory Cooperation, and Political Legitimacy, 21 REV. INT'L STUD 251 (1995). 
193. International Association ofInsurance Supervisors, 1994 Annual Report 2 (1995). 
194. Zaring; supra note 190, at 30\ -304. These organizations are not international organizations 
under international law because they lack state membership, tangible manifestations of 
organizational bureaucracy, and adequate legal pedigree. According to the Restatement (Third) of 
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, an international organization refers to an 
organization "created by an international agreement [with] a membership consisting mainly or 
principally of states." See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States SS 
221 (1987). In this context, Zaring argues that these organizations occupy a "twilight" legal 
existence. See Zaring, supra note 190. 
195. Id. 
196. James Salzman, Labor Rights Globalization and Institutions: The Role and Influence oj 
the OrganizationJor Economic Cooperation and Development, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 769, 772-773 
(2000); see also Slaughter, supra 106, at 196 (arguing that "[t]he next generation of institutions is ... 
likely to look more like the Basel Committee, or, more formally, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, dedicated to providing a forum for transnational problem-solving 
and the harmonization of national law"). 
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Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the OECD was 
initially established to strengthen the economies of its member states, 
and thereafter expanded its mission to identify common issues and 
coordinate national and worldwide policies. 197 Because the OECD offers 
a closed setting for its member states through the closed-door meetings, 
this feature of restricted membership and transparency makes difference 
from conventional international organizations. As a result, the OECD 
provides a "restricted forum on virtually unrestricted topics."198 
As noted above, network governance (the external dimension of complex 
sovereignty) requires the functioning of independent (effective) internal 
self-regulatory agencIes (the internal dimension of complex 
sovereignty).I99 In this sense, globalization has propelled the 
development of autonomous agencies, the development of "a state within 
a state."200 It is important to note that the autonomy and independence led 
to the formation of a system of network governance where these agencies 
actively participated in the formulation and management of the 
regulatory institutions.20l More importantly, the trans-governmental 
network governance depends on compliance, consensus, or good-faith 
agreements among nations. 202 In this regard, this regulatory system is 
concerned with establishing international soft law in the form of broad 
regulatory standards and general regulatory standards followed by 
compliance of state agencies rather than strict rules and direct 
enforcement. 203 
However, in response to the trans-governmentalism, some cntIcs 
acknowledge that the significance of networks, but argue that they 
reduce transparency and impede political accountability.204 The club-like 
feature of networks may reinforce the dominance of the major economic 
powers, particularly inequalities among countries. 205 Critics also claim 
that networks present the political right with a useful but ultimately 
dangerous substitute for traditional multilateralism 206 Here, the point to 
note is the anti-globalization argument that the process of establishment 
197. See id. at 773. 
198. Id. at 776-777. 
199. Jayasuriya, supra note 99, at 450. 
200. Id. at 439 (pointing out "the globalization of economic relations increasingly fractures the 
internal cohesiveness within the State, but this fracturing means the creation of islands of 
sovereignty within the State"). 
201. See id. at 450. 
202. Id. at 453. 
203. See id. 
204. Howse; supra note 114, at 12. 
205. Kennedy, supra note 1\5, at 412. 
206. Philip Alston, The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and Globalization, 
8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 435 (1997). 
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and implementation of global standards are under the Western industrial 
states' dominance, and represents an emerging global network 
governance that threaten undeveloped countries' state sovereignty and 
takes away their freedom of action as sovereign states.207 
In this context, one observer stresses a democratization of the legislative 
process by which global standards as international soft law are 
established, a flexibility in implementation of the standards reflecting 
local legal tradition and practice, a full incorporation of the majority of 
nation-states into the legislative process concerning the development of 
the standards, and a prioritization of the implementation of global 
standards on a country-by-country basis. 208 In short, undeveloped 
countries will apparently resist in complying with global standards unless 
they have a realistic chance to absorb and accept the standards. In this 
sense, the development of new standards needs to be treated as an 
evolutionary and educational process. 209 
Consequently, like prior views, an "all-or-nothing" perspective for the 
analysis of desirable forum of global governance ignores exploring each 
component of it, as it is at present in the international system. In this 
sense, emphasis should be given to the corroboration of all the state and 
non-state actors in the international system in terms of liberal 
internationalism, trans-governmentalism, and new medievalism with full 
understanding of traditional international law so that governments, 
business, and NGOs, and international institutions can strengthen the 
nation-state system, by helping solve problems regulators cannot deal 
with. 
B. ENHANCING GLOBAL TAX GOVERNANCE 
With the increasing role of the OECD in the international tax regime, the 
network of international tax conventions has come into sharp focus in 
recent years. Some argue that the bilateral tax treaty network is "a 
triumph of international law," and a framework for the international tax 
regime based on principles underlying these treaties. 2 !O That is, over 1500 
bilateral tax treaties with similarity in policy and language constitute an 
international tax regime. 211 Indeed, the treaties are similar because they 
207. Herbert Morais, The Quest for International Standards: Global Governance vs. 
Sovereignty, 50 U. KAN L. REV. 779,779-780 (2002). 
208. See id. at 806-820. 
209. Id. at 820. 
210. Rosenbloom, supra note 139, at 164. 
211. Avi-Yonah. supra note 141, at 169. 
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have been based on the same OEeD and UN models.212 In most 
countries, the treaties have priority over domestic ordinary statutes, 
thereby constraining domestic tax jurisdiction. As a result, nation-states 
are bound by treaty to behave in certain ways, and cannot enact 
legislation to the contrary.213 
Others argue that a network of bilateral tax treaties seems increasingly 
inconsistent with multinational business structure.214 It does not look 
more likely to work for the international tax system. 215 As such, 
multinational enterprises may take advantage of the "current situation by 
planning their affairs to exploit inconsistencies in the network of national 
tax laws and treaties."216 Moreover, the current treaty regime poses 
challenges to developing countries. That is, many less-developed 
countries find it difficult to participate in treaty network because they do 
not have substantial resources to negotiate numerous treaties while a 
considerable amount of time is needed to negotiate and ratify each 
treaty. 217 
Accordingly, one could argue that globalization has posed pressures to 
the current tax rules, and critical limitations on taxing powers.218 As a 
result, some claim that a multilateral agreement would provide more 
flexibility than the bilateral treaty, and "replace the existing treaty with a 
single, uniform text."219 
212. See id; see also OECD, Model Income Tax Convention on Income and Capital, July 23, 
1992, I Tax Treaties (CCH) P 191 [hereinafter OECD Model Treaty]; U.N. Model Double Taxation 
Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries, 1980, I Tax Treaties (CCH) P 206 
[hereinafter UN Model Treaty]. The U.S.A. has issued a model treaty (l996), which follows the 
OECD model. 
213. Avi-Yonah, supra note 139, 169. However, arguably, in some ways, the OECD Model 
Treaty is a victim of its own success: Due to unattractive compromises, and the vagueness of major 
provisions, and getting behind current tax developments, the effectiveness of bilateral tax treaties is 
limited in removing tax impediments to cross-border investment, and in preventing international tax 
avoidance. See BRIAN J. ARNOLD & MICHAELJ. McINTYRE, INT'L TAX PRIMER 100 (1995). 
214. Victor Thuronyi, International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Treaty, 26 BROOK. J. 
INT'L L. 1641, 1651 (arguing that "[t]he current network of bilateral tax treaties would work well if 
each multinational corporate group were located in no more than two countries. Each bilateral tax 
treaty could then appropriately provide for the taxation of the group. There is, of course no such 
constraint on multinational enterprises."). 
215. See id. at 1653 (asserting that the nature of bilateral treaties limits the negotiations to the 
concerns of the two countries involved, and that because global concerns are subordinate, 
negotiators focus on benefits "for business headquartered in their country instead of how the treaty 
fits in with the global tax system"). 
216. Id. at 1647. 
217. Seeid.atl651. 
218. Charles E. McClure, Jr., Globalization, Tax Rules, and Sovereignty, 55 Bulletin for In!'1 
Fiscal Documentation 328 (200l). 
219. Thuronyi, supra note 214, at 1641-1642. Arguably, all countries are affected by the 
amendments and interpretation of the agreement at the same time.ld. at 1644. Ironically, the success 
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Now is the time to examine the OECD's role in international tax regime 
in terms of global governance. Here, the question is whether the OECD's 
efforts at "global tax governance" as a "global tax network" are right on 
target. 220 The successful functioning of the OECD in international 
taxation as a global tax network depends on its intent to fill the global 
governance gap in taxation. As stated above, the OECD has been 
criticized for its restricted membership, the feature of rich man's club, 
and the lack of transparency. In particular, the inability of developing 
countries to participate in the OECD has resulted in the failure of the 
OECD's initiative to counteract tax havens.221 Furthermore, the OECD's 
initiative has been attacked in that it violated international law due to the 
intervention in other states' domestic affairs, and the OECD's lack of 
legal ability to form a treaty.222 
In this regard, it is argued that "[d]eveloping countries should have a 
meaningful voice in any world tax body or tax convention 
arrangement."223 One way for developing countries to be granted a 
meaningful voice is to consider special arrangements to ensure the 
reflection of their interests on the agenda, and to minimize the 
dominance by largest contributors like the United States.224 
Under the circumstances, there is a strong argument to establish an 
"International Tax Organization" (ITO) to enhance global tax 
governance because the inability of other international organizations to 
handle tax issues leads to the creation of the ITO for both developed and 
of the OECD bilateral Model Treaty implies the plausibility of a multilateral treaty. Id. at 1662-1663. 
Some point to the drawbacks of a bilateral treaty: As for the tax arbitrage, "the [partial and] 
retrospective nature of [treaty] remedies] maximizes political opposition to changes that benefit the 
government, it is always harder to take away tax benefits taxpayers believe are "theirs" than to 
prevent their acquisition ab initio ... treaties are even less subject to updating and amendment than 
legislation." See Roin, supra note 145, at 76-77. 
220. This OECD's efforts have been postulated in August 2001. The reported function of this 
"network" would be discussions of tax matters of common interest, sharing experiences, identifying 
best practices, and maintaining a widely accessible database on technical assistance activities in tax 
policy and administration. See Frances M. Horner, Do we need an International Tax Organization?, 
21 Tax Notes Int'I 179, 182-183 (2001); see also Technical Note, Existing Proposals for Enhanced 
International Cooperation on Tax Matters, United Nations AlAe. 257/xx (Aug. 2001). 
221. Horner, supra note 220, at 181. In this regard, the designers of the OECD did not anticipate 
an international governance role. The problem is that the OECD in tax function was not set up for 
the kind of policy coordination it now enjoys. Id. 
222. Gilbert Morris, The Loss of Sovereignty, The United Nations, and Offshore Financial 
Centers, Worldwide Tax Daily, Aug. 27,2001, available at LEXIS 2001 WTD 171-13. 
223. Horner, supra note 220. at 186. 
224. Id. (noting one possibility to reserve a few items on the agenda for developing countries, 
and super-majority voting to weight developing country votes more heavily in some cases on the 
other hand). 
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developing countries. 225 With this understanding, a proposal, known as 
the Zedillo report, for the creation of the ITO was issued as a part of the 
United Nations' Financing for Department initiative in 2001. 226 The 
proponents of the ITO point out that an ITO would be in a better position 
to "recognize the reality of territorial and worldwide systems of taxation, 
and then set forth rules such as a safe harbor for excluding exterritorial 
income. "227 
In response to the argument about the creation the ITO, critics assert that 
an ITO would be redundant in the context of tax expertise and agenda of 
the OECD.228 Even among tax experts, there is no global consensus as to 
such issues regarding "what sort of tax to levy at the corporate level and 
how to relate that tax to the taxation of shareholders."229 Nor is the ITO is 
likely to be created in the near future. 23o 
As noted, the critical agenda is how to fill the governance gap in 
taxation. Despite the criticism about the OECD's role in international 
taxation, its on-going efforts at global tax governance as a global tax 
network have brought a considerable attention. Here, it deserves pointing 
to an empirical study on the examination of three regulatory policy 
arenas, such as secUrIties regulation, competitIOn policy, and 
environmental policy, in which transgovernmental networks have 
arisen. 231 This study illustrates that networks play different roles in 
accordance with the spectrum of regulatory power. In short, the 
concentration of regulatory powers in securities regulation encourages 
harmonization, and thus networks can be alternatives. 
In contrast, the diffusion of regulatory powers in environmental 
regulation leads to harmonization but less likely, and thus treaties fill the 
gaps while networks may strengthen the compliance with treaties. 
225. See generally. id.; see also, VITO TANZI, TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD (\995) 
(arguing that globalization is pushing tax systems under substantial pressure and that the 
coordinating role of the OECD "falls far short of what it needs to be on a worldwide scale .... There 
is no world institution with the responsibility to establish desirable rules for taxation and with 
enough clout to include countries to follow those rules. Perhaps the time has come to establish 
one."). 
226. Report of the High Level Panel on Financing for Development, available at 
http://www.un.orgireportS/financing [hereinafter the Zedillo Report]. 
227. William M. Funk, The Thirty-Years Tax War, Tax Notes Today, Oct. 9, 2001, available at 
LEXIS, Tax Analyst File. 
228. Homer, supra note 205, at 179; see also Outgoing Staffer Discusses Treaty Policy, 76 Tax 
Notes 1536 (1997) (arguing that "[ilt has not proven practical to have a multilateral tax treaty"). 
229. Shaviro, supra note 147, at 330. 
230. Avi-Yonah, supra note 120, at 1649. 
231. Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Trans-governmental 
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 V A. J. INT'L L. I, at 26-51,72,76 (2002). 
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Meanwhile, the moderate concentration of the powers in competition 
policy supports the liberal internationalism by promoting convergence in 
regulatory approach.232 It is worth noting that as gap-fillers, global 
networks have fostered international cooperation and facilitated global 
convergence, thus enhancing the effectiveness and compliance of 
treaties. 233 
Likewise, an emphasis should be placed on the coordination of bilateral 
tax treaty network and global tax network toward enhancing global tax 
governance. In this context, a special attention should be given to fill the 
governance gaps through the evolution of the OECD as a global tax 
network, and participation of developing countries in the agenda rather 
than the creation of an ITO as a multilateral tax treaty. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Globalization has certainly influenced the power and authority of nation-
states. The process of globalization transformed the Westphalia notions 
of sovereignty associated with exclusive territorial jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, nation-states are, and will remain the main actors in 
international economic affairs under international law. 
In the meantime, global economy with new information technologies has 
raised questions regarding how to characterize the function of nation-
states as actors in international financial markets. Moreover, the debate 
as to the framework of regulatory governance in the global economy has 
been still subject to critical scrutiny. 
The new system of global regulatory governance reflecting the 
fragmentation and desegregation of state sovereignty stresses the active 
participation of independent decentralized government agencies rather 
than supranational international regimes along with regulators' 
compliance with broad regulatory standards constituting international 
soft law instead of direct enforcement. In this context, trans-
governmentalism highlights nationalization of international law toward 
the regulatory harmonization. 
However, these claims are still controversial, and the subject of hot 
debate even though global network governance has emerged in the 
232. See id. Raustiala argues that "the distribution of regulatory power helps account for the 
presence of treaties and therefore helps explain when, and how, networks may interact with treaties." 
See id. at 72. 
233. /d. at 90-92 (stating that "transgovernmental cooperation is a significant development in 
international law, one more likely to supplement liberal internationalism than supplant it"). 
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international economy. In order for all the undeveloped and 
industrialized countries to benefit from the regime of global regulatory 
governance in the age of globalization, various types of realistic 
measures should be taken to reduce inequalities between North and 
South. Otherwise, global standards as international soft law will not be 
apparently welcome to developing and transitional countries. 
Under the perspective, this paper has set out some considerations 
regarding the measures needed for enhancing global tax governance. At 
the center of the debate over the interplay between bilateral tax treaty 
network and global tax network, this paper has taken the position that the 
interplay lies somewhere between liberal internationalism that 
emphasizes tax treaties under international law, and trans-
governmentalism stressing the primacy of global tax network as the 
central actor in the international tax regime. 
More importantly, the task of enhancing global tax governance requires 
filling the governance gap in the international tax regime. The success of 
this agenda depends largely on whether any international tax policy 
forum has transparency, legitimacy and accountability. In this context, 
the evolution of the OECD as a global tax network is inevitable. That is, 
if the OECD still attempts to serve a useful role in global tax governance, 
developing countries should be given an effective voice in the forum. 
Otherwise, developing countries may find that a global tax arrangement 
holds little interest, and poses some dangers.234 
Meanwhile, the time has not come to establish the International Tax 
Organization since the proposal for the creation still needs global 
consensus from tax experts, academics, and authorities around the world. 
Under the circumstances, a special attention should be paid on the 
coordination of bilateral tax treaty network and global tax network. 
Finally, this paper concludes in pointing to one observer's argument that 
"[g]lobal governance will come not at the expense of the state but rather 
as an expression of the interests that the state embodies. As the source of 
order and basis of governance, the state will remain in the future as 
effective, and will be essential, as it has ever been."235 
234. Homer, supra note 220, at 187. 
235. Martin Wolf, Will the Nation·State survive Globalization? 80 FOREIGN AFFAIRS No. I 
at 190 (Jan. /Feb. 2001). 
42
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 10 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol10/iss1/7
